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Article
Deception is a ubiquitous phenomenon, and people at all 
times have sought to find ways to detect it. Humans have 
searched for indicators of deception in physiological, non-
verbal, and paraverbal behavior, and the very content of what 
people are saying. Since the beginning of experimental psy-
chology, researchers have systematically investigated differ-
ent types of cues assumed to reveal deception (Benussi, 
1914; Freud, 1905/1959; Wertheimer & Klein, 1904; see 
Bunn, 2012; Grubin & Madsen, 2005; Sporer, 2008, for his-
torical reviews). Despite these efforts, meta-analyses indi-
cate that humans are not very good at discriminating between 
truths and lies (C. F. Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Reasons may 
lie in the complexity and difficulty of the task, incorrect 
beliefs about cues, and the use of invalid cues, as well as the 
pervasive biases in decision making (Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & 
Marksteiner, 2011; Vrij, 2008b).
In this meta-analysis, we focus on the use of computers to 
overcome these limitations. However, we unpretentiously 
believe that the present contribution goes far beyond this 
goal. Based on a series of theoretical frameworks rooted in 
cognitive and social psychology, we posed (and tested) spe-
cific directional hypotheses concerning the potential utility 
to detect deception with a number of linguistic cues. Our 
findings are relevant not only in terms of the potential practi-
cal utility of computers to detect deception but also in terms 
of basic knowledge about the language of deception and the 
underlying theories predicting specific linguistic differences 
between truths and lies.
Human Judgmental Biases
Humans are biased lie detectors. Biases include a reliance on 
cognitive heuristics (Levine & McCornack, 2001), overesti-
mation of dispositional factors (O’Sullivan, 2003), and an 
exaggerated focus on nonverbal relative to verbal content 
cues (Reinhard et al., 2011; Vrij, 2008b). Other researchers 
have shown that humans are prone to truth or lie biases 
(Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; Meissner & Kassin, 
2002; Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984), which 
are the tendency to judge statements as truthful—or as decep-
tive—regardless of their actual veracity. It has also been 
shown that observers’ veracity judgments are affected by 
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This meta-analysis investigates linguistic cues to deception and whether these cues can be detected with computer programs. 
We integrated operational definitions for 79 cues from 44 studies where software had been used to identify linguistic 
deception cues. These cues were allocated to six research questions. As expected, the meta-analyses demonstrated that, 
relative to truth-tellers, liars experienced greater cognitive load, expressed more negative emotions, distanced themselves 
more from events, expressed fewer sensory–perceptual words, and referred less often to cognitive processes. However, 
liars were not more uncertain than truth-tellers. These effects were moderated by event type, involvement, emotional 
valence, intensity of interaction, motivation, and other moderators. Although the overall effect size was small, theory-
driven predictions for certain cues received support. These findings not only further our knowledge about the usefulness of 
linguistic cues to detect deception with computers in applied settings but also elucidate the relationship between language 
and deception.
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factors unrelated to the veracity of particular statements, 
such as the sender’s facial appearance (Masip, Garrido, & 
Herrero, 2003). Likewise, C. F. Bond and DePaulo (2006) 
argued that people hold the stereotype that liars are “tor-
mented, anxious, and conscience stricken” (p. 216), and that 
they may draw on this stereotype when judging the veracity 
of other people.
As a possible remedy to overcome these deficiencies in 
human judgments, physiological psychologists and brain 
researchers have utilized “machines” like the polygraph, 
voice stress analyzer, pupillometry, electromyogram, and 
brain imagery (e.g., electroencephalogram [EEG], functional 
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) to detect deception. In 
the last 40 years, but particularly most recently, scientists 
from various fields have also sought to detect deception by 
analyzing speech content with computers, looking for spe-
cific word cues or sentence structures to reveal deception.
A computer system would arguably be less prone to the 
influence of biases and stereotypes than human judges. There 
would be virtually no top-down processing. In addition, 
online assessment of various deception cues from ongoing 
interactions or videos can tax the cognitive capacity of 
human judges and lead to errors. Computers can quickly ana-
lyze large amounts of information and provide more reliable 
data. These are the principal reasons for the appeal of the 
automatization of lie detection. However, we must not forget 
that computers do not make choices about definitions of 
word categories nor about the specific words to be contained 
in broader categories. Most importantly, computers do not 
make choices about the direction of any particular cue as a 
lie or truth indicator. It is important to stress that, for a com-
puter to be able to detect deception, the linguistic character-
istics to be analyzed must be revealing of deception. Here, in 
examining what linguistic cues identified with computers 
differ between truths and lies, we also contribute to our basic 
understanding about linguistic markers of deception.
Can Computers Be Useful to Detect 
Deception?
In an attempt to identify and quantify linguistic cues to 
deception, researchers had a (unrealistic) dream: Enter peo-
ples’ words into a computer to find out whether they are tell-
ing the truth or not. In an early study, Knapp, Hart, and 
Dennis (1974) assessed several linguistic cues using a pro-
gram called TEXAN on a CDC 6500 mainframe computer. 
The program analyzed word frequencies without taking con-
textual meaning into account. Most of the investigated cues 
significantly differed in the expected direction between 
truths and lies.
Many years passed until similar but more modern word 
frequency count approaches were used regularly to deception 
detection (at least in research contexts). The most common 
program, called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; 
Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001), was developed to count 
words in psychology-relevant dimensions across multiple 
text files. LIWC has been used in numerous domains like per-
sonality, health, or psychological adjustment (see Tausczik & 
Pennebaker, 2010, for a review). LIWC analyzes typed or 
transcribed accounts on a word-by-word basis, where each 
word is compared against a dictionary of 2000 pre-selected 
words allocated to 72 linguistic categories. Although LIWC 
was not specifically designed to assess deception, Newman, 
Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards (2003) used it to calculate 
the percentages of specific linguistic cues in true versus 
deceptive statements, yielding above-chance accuracy of 
classifications for different types of lies. Subsequently, 
researchers from a variety of fields have also applied LIWC 
with the same purpose (see Appendix C).
Other researchers realized that the methods used ought to 
be more complex. As a result, specialized programs and 
algorithms have been developed that are oriented more 
directly to detecting deception. For example, 
Agent99Analyzer was created to specifically detect (linguis-
tic cues to) deception in texts and videos (Fuller, Biros, 
Burgoon, Adkins, & Twitchell, 2006). One of its sub-tools is 
a natural language processing unit called “GATE” (General 
Architecture for Text Engineering; Cunningham, 2002; Qin, 
Burgoon, Blair, & Nunamaker, 2005). Other related auto-
mated text-based tools used were “iSkim” or “CueCal” 
(Zhou, Booker, & Zhang, 2002; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, 
& Twitchell, 2004). More specifically, smaller text units are 
analyzed and integrated in the context of the whole text 
through examining different levels of human language (e.g., 
sub-sentential, sentential, and discourse processing; see also 
Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Recently, a 
growing body of research using machine-learning approaches 
of natural language processing emerged to detect linguistic 
cues to deception (Nunamaker et al., 2012).
A highly sophisticated program of this kind called “Coh-
Metrix” (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004; 
McNamara & Graesser, 2012) goes beyond word frequency 
analysis. Specifically, in analyzing “cohesion relations,” 
Coh-Metrix takes into account meaning and context in which 
words or phrases occur in texts (http://cohmetrix.memphis.
edu). Although not specifically developed to detect decep-
tion, Coh-Metrix was recently applied for this purpose (e.g., 
Bedwell, Gallagher, Whitten, & Fiore, 2011). A somewhat 
different detection deception software called Automated 
Deception Analysis Machine (“ADAM”; Derrick, Meservy, 
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2012) focuses on editing processes 
while typing messages (e.g., backspace, delete, or spacebar) 
and measures response latencies. The program includes an 
automated interviewer asking questions from an internal 
script.
Taken together, various computer programs from differ-
ent research areas and labs originated in the last 15 years 
that were either applied to detecting deception or specifi-
cally developed for this purpose. The effectiveness of such 
programs can be better determined with a comprehensive 
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and integrative quantitative analysis of the results on vari-
ous linguistic cues to deception. This is the focus of the cur-
rent meta-analysis.
The Importance of Theory
Is this dream of automated lie detection realistic? A quick 
preview of our results hints to the fragmented nature of the 
findings from computer studies. Effect sizes in our meta-
analysis were coded in a way that positive g
u
s are indicative 
of truth, whereas negative g
u
s are indicative of deception. 
For 1,093 effect sizes we calculated for 79 linguistic cues, we 
obtained an approximately normal distribution centering on 
a mean effect size of g
u
 = −0.01 (SD = 0.37) and a Mdn of 
0.02. The effect sizes ranged from −1.95 to 1.43, and the first 
and third quartiles were −0.17 and 0.20, respectively. To get 
a more accurate picture of the diagnostic usefulness of lin-
guistic markers of deception, we calculated the absolute 
magnitude of all effect sizes, assuming that all were in the 
expected direction as predicted by a priori specified hypoth-
eses (Figure 1). The average absolute effect size was 0.26 
(SD = 0.26) with a Mdn of 0.19 (first quartile = 0.09, third 
quartile = 0.34). This average effect size denotes the maxi-
mum possible mean of all cues if the results had actually 
been in the direction predicted. This mean effect size implies 
that across all studies and cues, only small effect sizes were 
obtained. This suggests that without a priori theoretical pre-
dictions, computer analyses of linguistic cues to deception 
are a futile exercise. Can larger effect sizes be observed if we 
classify cues into theoretically meaningful categories and 
consider possible moderators?
Theoretical Approaches Used to 
Predict Linguistic Cues to Deception
We cannot provide an exhaustive review of all approaches 
taken by different research groups. Some authors may prefer 
to emphasize the role of emotion, arousal, and motivation, 
whereas communication researchers may look at deception as 
strategic behavior. We will address some of these alternative 
interpretations where appropriate. Instead, we focus more on 
a cognitive and memory-oriented approach, supplemented by 
Figure 1. Distribution of all absolute values effect sizes (k = 1,093).
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social-psychological considerations and self-presentation, 
which help us to pin down the differences in processes 
involved in telling true stories versus lies. Hence, we focus on 
four viewpoints resulting in six research questions: (a) recall-
ing an experience from episodic memory versus constructing 
a lie from semantic memory. Constructing a lie may be more 
cognitively taxing (Research Question 1) and reduces the cer-
tainty with which lies are delivered (Research Question 2). 
(b) Again drawing on the literature on memory, we discuss 
the role of emotion and affect in recall of true experiences 
versus reporting lies (Research Question 3). (c) We discuss 
the role of the self as an organizational principle as well as 
self-presentational strategies and the role of immediacy in 
communication (Research Question 4). (d) We draw on the 
reality monitoring (RM) framework to derive predictions 
about sensory and perceptual cues (Research Question 5) and 
cognitive operations (Research Question 6).
For each question, we noted those linguistic cues that 
would elucidate differences between accounts of truth-tellers 
and liars, clearly specifying the direction of effect for each 
cue. Some of the theoretical approaches we discuss elaborate 
retrieval and construction processes truth-tellers engage in 
when reporting an event whereas others focus on lie con-
struction. Furthermore, we developed clear operational defi-
nitions for each cue to provide consistency in the names and 
definitions used in different research areas (see Appendices 
A and B). Most cues investigated could be allocated to one of 
the six research questions. However, because some cues did 
not clearly fit in any theory or research question, they were 
relegated to the miscellaneous question category. Following 
are the principal research questions.
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience 
Greater Cognitive Load?
Telling a lie can be more cognitively demanding than truth-
telling, because it involves the execution of a number of con-
current tasks requiring a great deal of mental resources. In 
general, both liars and truth-tellers must tell a plausible and 
coherent story that does not contradict their own former state-
ments or facts that the observer/interviewer may know about. 
Also, in some cases, lying requires suppressing thoughts 
about the truth (Gombos, 2006); this may inadvertently pre-
occupy the speaker’s thinking (Pennebaker & Chew, 1985; 
see also Lane & Wegner’s, 1995, model of secrecy). 
Furthermore, as communication researchers have empha-
sized, storytellers must monitor their own behaviors and 
observers’ reactions (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Truth-tellers 
may also engage in some of these cognitive processes but for 
liars, this task is more difficult because they cannot easily 
draw on episodic memories. Instead, they must rely on the 
semantic memory system or on rather nonspecific scripts or 
schemata (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Sporer & Küpper, 1995).
When constructing a lie, a convincing scenario has to be 
communicated. However, due to the demands for cognitive 
resources, a lie may not include the complexities and rich-
ness of information that characterize reports of real experi-
ences. In contrast, telling a story about a true event relies on 
retrieval of experienced events. Although this typically 
involves reconstruction, and may at times even take increased 
effort, recall of episodic memories and supporting details is 
generally rather automatic.
Much research on the cognitive load approach has not 
been grounded on well-articulated cognitive models of 
deception (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, & Yoo, 2014). 
Yet, a few such models have been proposed to specify cog-
nitive processes involved in lie production (for reviews, see 
Gombos, 2006; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 
2013). Some of these models (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 
2007; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014; Walczyk 
et al., 2013; Walczyk et al., 2005) have invoked Baddeley’s 
(2000, 2006) working memory model, which involves 
transferring information from long-term memory to an epi-
sodic buffer in working memory. While this should facili-
tate truth-telling, it should also make lying more difficult 
(see, for example, Walczyk et al., 2013; Walczyk et al., 
2014; Walczyk et al., 2005).
Does research support the cognitive load assumptions? 
Numerous recent studies (for review, see Vrij & Granhag, 
2012) have provided indirect evidence by experimentally 
increasing a storyteller’s task demands. This has elicited 
more discernible cues to deception than in control, lower 
cognitive load conditions. Note, however, that manipulat-
ing “cognitive load” is not equivalent to assessing the cog-
nitive mechanisms postulated as a function of such 
manipulations (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). More direct 
(and revealing) evidence comes from behavioral studies 
using response latencies and other indices of cognitive load 
(e.g., Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; R. Johnson, 
Barnhardt, & Xhu, 2004; Walczyk et al., 2005; for a sum-
mary, see Walczyk et al., 2013). There is even evidence 
from brain-imaging studies (e.g., Abe, 2009; Christ, Van 
Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009) showing 
that telling lies, particularly those involving short responses, 
requires greater involvement of and access to key mental 
resources than truth-telling (Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & 
Vosse, 2008).
Cues to deception theoretically connected to the cognitive 
load perspective have been found in previous meta-analyses, 
particularly for nonverbal and paraverbal behaviors (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). In comparison 
with truth-tellers, liars had longer response latencies, tended 
to communicate shorter stories, made more speech errors, 
nodded less, and displayed fewer hand, foot, and leg move-
ments. Particularly relevant for the analysis of linguistic 
markers are findings on verbal content cues that demonstrate 
that compared with true accounts, deceptive accounts appear 
less plausible, coherent, and detailed while including more 
phrase and word repetitions. These indices can be signs of 
the experience of cognitive load either from a taxed system 
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(e.g., longer response latencies) or because of liars’ strategies 
to reduce cognitive load (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & 
Griffith-Ross, 2009).
Predictions. From a cognitive load/working memory perspec-
tive, we predict that compared with true accounts, false 
accounts will be (a) shorter as indicated by word and sen-
tence quantity cues; (b) less precisely elaborated as indicated 
by fewer content words (expressing lexical meaning), a 
lower type-token ratio (number of distinct content words, for 
example, house, walk, mother) divided by total number of 
words), and shorter words (i.e., less than six letters; average 
word length); (c) involve less complex stories as indicated by 
fewer verbs, fewer causation words (because, effect, hence) 
and fewer exclusive words (but, except, without), and (d) 
include more writing errors (possibly moderated by mode of 
production [orally telling a lie, handwriting, or typing]). (For 
a list of the operational definition of all cues included, see 
Appendices A and B.)
From a different perspective, based on DePaulo’s self-
presentational perspective (DePaulo et al., 2003), one would 
expect that liars are less likely than truth-tellers to take their 
credibility for granted and therefore may take a greater effort 
and deliberately edit their communication (cf. Derrick et al., 
2012). Note, however, that this editing process will also 
usurp cognitive resources detracting from successful lie 
constructions.
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than 
Truth-Tellers?
DePaulo et al. (2003) contended that deceptive self-presenta-
tions are not as convincingly embraced as truthful ones. This 
may be a result either of the speakers’ moral scruples, which 
may lead them to feel guilty or ashamed when lying, or of 
liars not having as much personal investment in their claims 
as truth-tellers. The psychological closeness or distance 
between a speaker and his or her message might be reflected 
in language (Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968). Liars should dis-
play more linguistic markers indicative of psychological 
detachment than truth-tellers (Buller, Burgoon, Busling, & 
Roiger, 1996; Kuiken, 1981; Wagner & Pease, 1976; Zhou, 
Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004; Zhou, Burgoon, 
Twitchell, Qin, & Nunamaker, 2004). Indeed, in their meta-
analysis, DePaulo et al. (2003) found that liars were verbally 
and vocally less involved and more verbally and vocally 
uncertain than truth-tellers but observed no reliable differ-
ences for tentative constructs and shrugs. Uncertainty words 
have been proposed as markers of psychological distance 
between a speaker and his or her account (e.g., Kuiken, 
1981). Thus, liars’ accounts should contain more uncertainty 
words than truth-tellers’ accounts.
It may also be the case that deceivers withhold informa-
tion not to give their lies away. Indeed, research shows that 
when lying to conceal their transgressions, people indicate 
that they try not to provide incriminating details (Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Herrero, 2013) and 
try to keep the story simple (Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 
2006) or vague (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). 
DePaulo et al. (2003) found liars to be significantly more 
discrepant/ambivalent than truth-tellers. Therefore, liars 
might provide vague, ambiguous, or uncertain replies in 
order not to expose their lies (Buller et al., 1996; Cody, 
Marston, & Foster, 1984).
Predictions. From these perspectives, it is expected that liars 
will be less certain and definite than truth-tellers. Conse-
quently, deceptive accounts should contain fewer certainty 
words (always, clear, never) and more tentative words (guess, 
maybe, perhaps, seem) and modal verbs (can, shall, should) 
than truthful accounts. (It should be noted that modal verbs 
also include the verb must that expresses more certainty and 
purposiveness whereas all other modal verbs indicate more 
uncertainty.)
It may be argued that liars are aware that uncertainty 
indicates deception and thus may strategically incorporate 
certainty indicators to evade detection (e.g., Bender, 1987). 
However, research does not support this contention. To our 
knowledge, around ten reports have been published so far 
on liars’ and truth-tellers’ strategies to be convincing (for a 
brief review, see Masip & Herrero, 2013). Only rarely has 
certainty (or any related construct) emerged as a strategy, 
and in these instances, it has been mentioned (a) only infre-
quently and (b) equally often by liars and truth-tellers (e.g., 
Hines et al., 2010: “admit uncertainty”; for an exception, see 
Strömwall et al., 2006).
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More 
Negations and Negative Emotion Words?
Emotional approach.1 When people lie, they may experience 
feelings of guilt and fear of getting caught (Ekman, 1988, 
2001).2 Even when telling everyday lies of little conse-
quence, people report feeling uncomfortable (DePaulo et al., 
2003). Vrij (2008a) also noted that liars might make negative 
comments or use negative words that reflect negative affect 
induced by guilt and fear.
Numerous studies have shown that arousal is associated 
with specific emotions (see the meta-analysis by Lench, 
Flores, & Bench, 2011), some of which are likely to be expe-
rienced by liars, such as guilt and fear of punishment (Ekman, 
2001; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). These 
emotional states may elicit specific nonverbal and verbal 
cues to deception (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006; Vrij, 2008a). Recent studies have used 
brain-imaging technology to specifically investigate the role 
of emotion in deception (for a review, see Abe, 2011). For 
example, Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, and Fujii (2007) found 
that neural structures associated with heightened emotions 
were also uniquely associated with deceiving an interrogator 
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and that self-reported feelings of immorality (sense of sin) 
and anxiety were higher in deceptive conditions than in 
truth-telling conditions. These results support the notion that 
deception is associated with negative emotions.
Predictions. From an emotional approach perspective, we 
predict that compared with true accounts, lies will include (a) 
more negation words (no, never, not) because these reveal a 
more defensive tone or denial of wrongdoing, which is likely 
to be accompanied by negative emotions of the liar, and (b) 
more words denoting overall negative emotions (enemy, 
worthless, skeptic), anger (hate, kill, weapon), anxiety 
(unsure, vulnerable), and sadness (tears, useless, unhappy).
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer 
Positive Emotion Words?
Research on autobiographical memory suggests that people’s 
emotional appraisal of past events tends to be positively 
biased (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). One mechanism 
by which this bias occurs is a tendency for emotions associ-
ated with negative-event memories to fade faster than emo-
tions associated with positive-event memories (Walker, 
Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003). In a review of this 
research, Walker and Skowronski (2009) suggested that this 
fading-affect bias leads people to generally remember events 
less negatively regardless of the original affect associated 
with the event. This effect is not due to forgetting of event 
details, as the accuracy of the memories is comparable for 
negative and positive events. It is the memory of the emo-
tional intensity associated with the event that fades, with 
negative events fading at a faster rate than positive events.
Predictions. Because truth-tellers have a specific memory of 
the event, whereas liars cannot draw on such an episodic 
memory, we predict that compared with true accounts, lies 
will contain fewer words denoting positive emotions (happy, 
pretty, good) or positive feelings (luck, joy).
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or 
Less Unspecified Emotion Words?
Many researchers from different fields, such as social psy-
chology, psychology and law, or computer linguistics (e.g., 
Ali & Levine, 2008; Fuller et al., 2006, Newman et al., 
2003), have investigated the frequency of occurrence of 
emotional and affective terms in true and deceptive accounts 
without taking the valence of these emotions into account. 
Therefore, we decided to also investigate the cues of unspec-
ified emotions (positive and negative) and pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the story despite the lack of theoretical 
specification of the direction in the original studies. 
Predictions could be derived from a social-psychological 
perspective. Depending on the seriousness of a lie, from a 
trivial lie in everyday life to high-stake lies, the situation may 
become increasingly emotional. Hence, one would predict 
higher frequencies of unspecified emotion words in lies than 
in truths.
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance 
Themselves More From Events?
In the preceding section, we have assumed that people are 
more likely to experience different types of negative emo-
tions when telling a lie. Given such negative experiences and 
emotions, from DePaulo et al.’s (2003) self-presentational 
perspective, we further assume that liars will distance them-
selves more from the story being told and, relatedly, will be 
less forthcoming than truth-tellers (see also Research 
Question 2 on certainty cues above). Possible linguistic indi-
cators for this assumption are personal pronouns, cues to 
responsibility, and verb tense shifts. To clarify the predic-
tions of specific cues, we present them within the theoretical 
accounts of immediacy, self-organization, egocentric bias, 
and narrative conventions.
Immediacy. A possible way to express ownership and take 
responsibility for an action or event is to tell a story from a 
first-person perspective, where the sender is reporting an 
event where he or she is the actor, not an observer-bystander. 
Evidence for this assumption comes from the long tradition 
of research on verbal and nonverbal communication that has 
investigated immediacy as a cue to truthful messages (Cody 
et al., 1984; Knapp et al., 1974; Kuiken, 1981; Mehrabian, 
1972; Wagner & Pease, 1976; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; 
Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004; Zhou, Bur-
goon, Twitchell, et al., 2004). In these studies, one aspect of 
immediacy has been operationalized as the psychological 
distance between the speaker and his or her communication. 
More specifically, immediacy can indicate the degree to 
which there is directness and intensity between the commu-
nicator and the event being communicated (Wiener & Meh-
rabian, 1968, p. 4). Taking this aspect of the definition of 
immediacy, deception researchers consider nonimmediacy 
as an indicator of deceptive communication by way of the 
speaker distancing from his or her own statement (e.g., 
Buller et al., 1996; Kuiken, 1981; Wagner & Pease, 1976; 
Zhou et al., 2004).
However, evidence for nonverbal and verbal indicators of 
the relationship between immediacy and deception is mixed. 
In the meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003), there were no 
significant effects for self- or other-references, but more gen-
eral indices of verbal immediacy (all categories) as well as 
verbal and vocal immediacy (impressions) were observed 
significantly more frequently or to a higher extent in truthful 
than fabricated messages. This latter effect appeared to be 
stronger when immediacy was measured subjectively than 
when assessed via more objective measures.
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The self as an organizational structure. Another line of research 
we consider is social-psychological theorizing on social 
memory, which has emphasized the role of the self as an 
organizational structure. In fact, one of the primary distinc-
tions between episodic and autobiographical memory is that 
the self provides an organizing principle that relates experi-
ences to one’s self-schema. Experimental evidence comes 
from research on the self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1977), which demonstrated that information is par-
ticularly well remembered when it has been encoded in rela-
tion to oneself, or when the person plays an active, rather 
than passive role (e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Variations 
on this theme are discussed under ego-defensive, self-serv-
ing, egocentric, or egotistic biases (see Greenwald, 1980). 
Greenwald (1980) went as far as referring to the self as a 
“totalitarian ego” that puts itself in the foreground, assuming 
a central role and ownership when talking about self-experi-
enced past events and actions. This prevailing tendency 
should lead to more frequent uses of first-person pronouns (I, 
me, we, us, our, etc.) when telling the truth relative to lying.
However, while the egocentric bias may play a role when 
reporting (complex) autobiographical events, it may be 
restricted to positive outcomes and reversed for negative out-
comes (Greenwald, 1980). Also, the so-called “better than 
average effect” refers to the tendency to evaluate oneself 
more favorably than an average peer (e.g., J. D. Brown, 
2012). For instance, 70% of high school seniors estimated 
that they had above average leadership skills, whereas only 
2% said their leadership skills were below average (College 
Board, 1976-1977). Another example of the positive out-
come bias is a classic study by Bahrick, Hall, and Berger 
(1996; see also Bahrick, 1996) who found that students accu-
rately recalled better high school grades than worse ones. 
Relatedly, in a classic study on the self-enhancing bias by 
Cialdini et al. (1976, Experiment 2), college students not 
only donned their school colors on Monday after their team 
had won but also identified, or distanced, themselves by use 
of different personal pronouns (“we won”; “they lost”). This 
suggests that first-person pronouns and statements of per-
sonal responsibility will be more prevalent among truth-tell-
ers than liars, particularly for positive outcomes.
Predictions. In summary, from different theoretical perspec-
tives, we assume more frequent use of first-person pronouns, 
and less frequent use of third-person pronouns for reports of 
self-experienced events. Self-experienced events should also 
be characterized by more statements of own responsibility, at 
least for positive outcomes. This prediction is more likely to 
hold for first-person singular than first-person plural because 
the plural may designate both the group the storyteller 
belongs to, and identifies with, as well as a communication 
partner who acts as an antagonist in an interaction (e.g., “we 
quarreled”). Thus, with plural pronouns, ownership and 
responsibility are less clear-cut than with singular pronouns. 
On the contrary, passive voice or generalizing terms in 
phrases like “one has to . . .” or “everybody does this . . .” 
signal less personal involvement and hence should be found 
more frequently in lies than truthful accounts.
Narrative conventions and verb tense shifts. Communication 
about past events follow narrative conventions (acquired 
during childhood) that require the storyteller to talk about 
who, what, when, where, and why (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; 
Neisser, 1982) and to adhere to a temporal structure (Bruner, 
1990). Anecdotal evidence from research on autobiographi-
cal memory for significant life events shows that people 
sometimes switch from telling a story in the past tense to the 
present tense at crucial moments of the event (Pillemer, Des-
rochers, & Ebanks, 1998). In many of these examples, it 
appears that the protagonist is reliving the past event, describ-
ing his or her sensory and perceptual experiences, making 
the accounts to appear more vivid (cf. the RM approach 
described in Research Question 5). Although present tense 
may be less concrete than past tense when it refers to repeated 
or routine actions (e.g., “I [usually] go to church on Sunday” 
versus “I went to church on Sunday”), when talking about a 
specific past event, present tense is more vivid than past 
tense. Whether verb tense shifts occur involuntarily or 
unconsciously, or are strategically used by skillful storytell-
ers (like fiction writers) to communicate intensity and feel-
ing to a recipient, cannot be answered by these archival type 
studies, nor by our meta-analyses.
Predictions. We expect reports of true events to be more likely 
to contain present tense verbs than lies, at least in accounts of 
personally significant events. For other types of lies, this pre-
diction may not hold. The live character of these narratives 
may also diminish with repeated retellings of a story. Con-
versely, lies should contain more past tense verbs than true 
accounts.
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer 
(Sensory and Contextual) Details?
RM framework applied to deception. The RM model by M. K. 
Johnson and Raye (1981) describes how individuals differ-
entiate between externally generated memories of actual 
experiences versus memories of internally generated events 
that involve thoughts, fantasies, or dreams. In contrast to 
imagined events, experienced events are encoded and embed-
ded in memory within an elaborate network of information 
that typically includes more perceptual details, and contex-
tual and semantic information. Conversely, internally gener-
ated memories are characterized by cognitive inferences or 
reasoning processes.
People differentiate between their own external and inter-
nal memories on the basis of these phenomenal characteris-
tics (M. K. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), and 
similar features are also useful to differentiate between 
accounts of external and internal memories of other people 
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(an attribution process that has been tagged “interpersonal 
reality monitoring”; M. K. Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; 
M. K. Johnson & Suengas, 1989; Sporer, 2004; Sporer & 
Sharman, 2006).
Deceptive accounts can be characterized as representing 
internally generated memories, because in a deceptive situ-
ation, people imagine the event at the time of its construc-
tion (Sporer, 2004). Even if people lie by borrowing from 
actual experience, the time and place or the context in which 
the event occurred may be changed during construction 
(Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008a). Therefore, even partially true 
deceptive accounts may lack the typical characteristics of 
true accounts. With these considerations in mind, research-
ers have extrapolated from the RM model to make predic-
tions about specific sets of criteria that may discriminate 
between true and deceptive accounts (e.g., Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Olsson, 2001; Sporer, 1997; for reviews, see 
Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004; 
Vrij, 2008a). DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis, which 
only included a few studies available then, showed small 
and nonsignificant effect sizes for RM criteria. However, in 
a more comprehensive review of studies, Masip et al. (2005) 
found that some of the RM criteria involving perceptual pro-
cesses, contextual (including time) information, and real-
ism/plausibility of the story were useful to discriminate 
between truth and deception.
Predictions. From a RM perspective, we predict that compared 
with true accounts, false accounts will (a) contain fewer per-
ceptual details as indicated by sensory and perceptual word 
cues (taste, touch, smell), (b) be less contextually embedded 
as indicated by space (around, under) and time word cues 
(hour, year), and (c) include fewer descriptive words as indi-
cated by prepositions (on, to), numbers (first, three), quanti-
fiers (all, bit, few), modifiers (adverbs and adjectives), and 
motion verbs (walk, run, go). This latter set of cues involves 
words that describe events and actions in the story in more 
specific terms (e.g., “I took every short cut to get to work”). 
The lack of these words (e.g., “I went to work”) would make 
the account seem less real or vivid as would be predicted from 
the RM perspective (Sporer, 1997, 2004).
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less (Yes, 
Less!) Often to Cognitive Processes?
The RM approach, unlike other verbal content cues based 
credibility assessment procedures, such as Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis (CBCA, Steller & Köhnken, 1989), does 
not only contain “truth criteria” (e.g., spatial and time details) 
but also one lie criterion. Specifically, RM predicts that ref-
erences to internal processes at the time of the event (cogni-
tive operations like reasoning processes) should be more 
likely contained in imagined than in self-experienced events. 
Applied to detecting deception, researchers have conse-
quently postulated that references to cognitive operations 
can be used as a lie criterion (Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2008a).
However, empirical evidence regarding this proposition is 
mixed. Perhaps, depending on the operationalization of this 
construct, some studies have found more references to cogni-
tive operations in lies (e.g., Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 
2004), many studies have found no differences (e.g., Sporer 
& Sharman, 2006; 14 out of 19 studies reviewed in Vrij, 
2008a), and some studies have found reliably more refer-
ences to internal processes (like memory processes and 
rehearsal as well as thoughts) in true accounts (Granhag 
et al., 2001; Sporer, 1998; Sporer & Walther, 2006; Vrij, 
Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000).
From a different perspective, some 30 years of research on 
autobiographical memory has emphasized the associative 
nature of memories. Recollecting (personally significant) life 
events involves not only the conscious utilization of retrieval 
cues but also cross-referencing to supporting memories 
related to the event in question. It also involves rehearsal pro-
cesses, which are important determinants of remembering 
(Conway, 1990). These processes can also be subsumed under 
cognitive operations. To the extent that studies on deception 
involve complex (autobiographical) events, like being ques-
tioned about a crime or reporting an alibi, such retrieval pro-
cesses and supporting memories (cf. the CBCA criterion 
“External Associations”) are likely to be used and mentioned 
when recalling true events (e.g., “I know it was the day before 
Easter because Good Friday was my birthday.”).
Finally, there is empirical evidence from several studies 
that cognitive operations are positively correlated not only 
with other RM criteria (Sporer, 1997, 2013) but also with 
many CBCA criteria like “External Associations,” “Own 
Psychological Processes,” “Spontaneous Corrections,” or 
“Doubts about one’s own Testimony,” loading on a common 
underlying factor (Sporer, 2004, Table 4.4). All of these cri-
teria are assumed to indicate truthfulness.
Predictions. Consequently, we predict that linguistic cues 
referring to cognitive operations including memory pro-
cesses are more likely to be found in truths than in lies. The 
two cues under this research question are cognitive processes 
(cause, ought) and insight words (think, know, consider).
Miscellaneous Category
Because many linguistic cues were investigated without a 
specific theoretical background or directed predictions, we 
created a miscellaneous category including linguistic cues 
analyzed in more than five studies (e.g., inhibition, social 
processes, health, sports; see Appendix B).
Hypotheses for Moderator Variables
It would be unwise to assume that the above predictions will 
hold across all types of lies, motivation, level of interaction, 
production mode, and other contextual factors. Hence, we 
conducted a series of moderator analyses within the theoreti-
cal frameworks provided above.
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Event Type and Personal Involvement
Across studies, senders described events or attitudes that dif-
fered in terms of personal involvement. We organized the 
studies into three categories. In the “Attitude/liking” para-
digm, senders described their attitude toward a specific topic 
or person they like or dislike. In the “First-person experi-
ence” paradigm, senders experienced a staged event or mock 
crime, described a personal life event, or were involved in a 
real criminal case. Finally, the “Miscellaneous” category 
included studies where participants solved a problem, per-
formed a specific task, or described a video scene.3 We do 
acknowledge, however, that some attitudes/liking studies 
may also reflect high involvement but this would work 
against our hypothesis.
We argue that the higher the personal involvement in the 
event, the higher the cognitive load (e.g., due to a preoccupa-
tion with an interaction partner’s reactions) and arousal (neg-
ative or unspecified emotions) will be when telling a lie. 
Also, liars might express more uncertainty terms or try to 
distance themselves more from events when their personal 
involvement is high. In other words, we expect the effects 
under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, and 4 to be larger for 
the “First-person experience” compared with the “Attitude/
liking” or the “Miscellaneous” paradigms in the aforemen-
tioned direction.
Emotional Valence
The topics or events senders were asked to talk about were 
classified as positive (e.g., holidays), neutral (e.g., task per-
formance), or negative (e.g., confession of wrongdoing) in 
nature. If we assume that more negative emotions accom-
pany telling a negative rather than a neutral event, liars 
should express even more negative emotion words when the 
event is negative (Research Question 3a). Also, we assume 
that the amount of unspecified emotion words (Research 
Question 3a) will be higher when the event is not neutral. 
Moreover, cognitive load might also be higher because send-
ers have to deal with additional negative emotions that may 
induce concern, leading to a decrease in word count and 
diverse and exclusive words (Research Question 1—
Cognitive Load: cues 01, 02, 03).
Also, if liars are more negatively involved in their story, 
they could appear more uncertain (Research Question 2—
Certainty) and try to distance themselves more using less 
self- and more other-references (Research Question 4—
Distancing). In summary, we hypothesized that effect sizes 
under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, and 4 would be high-
est (in the expected direction) if the emotional valence was 
negative rather than neutral (or positive).
Intensity of Interaction
The degree of interactions between the storyteller and 
another person varies widely in deception detection research 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2012). We differentiated four interaction 
levels: (a) no interaction: participants are only given a writ-
ten or spoken instruction; (b) computer-mediated communi-
cation: participants are communicating via connected 
computers (e.g., only by typing words in studies included); 
(c) interview: interviewees are simply responding to ques-
tions from an interviewer (one-way direction); and (d) per-
son to person interactions: sender and receiver are present in 
person and interacting bidirectionally.4 We hypothesized that 
with increasing intensity of interactions from (a) to (d) (cf. 
Buller & Burgoon, 1996), effects would become stronger 
under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, and 4.
Motivation
Researchers varied the level of motivation for their senders 
to appear credible. Some researchers did not motivate their 
senders at all, some others tried to motivate them with incen-
tives or written instructions, and still others used accounts 
from real criminal cases, where the motivation to appear 
credible must have been high due to real consequences for 
getting caught (high-stake lies; cf. DePaulo et al., 2003).
DePaulo and Kirkendol (1989) postulated the motiva-
tional impairment effect, according to which highly moti-
vated liars try to control their expressive behaviors to appear 
credible, but they are only successful in doing so with their 
verbal behavior, while their nonverbal behavior appears dis-
rupted. In other words, liars’ nonverbal behavior should be 
impaired whereas their verbal behavior (i.e., the content of 
messages) should be improved. DePaulo, Lanier, and Davis 
(1983) provided support for these hypotheses, as highly 
motivated liars were easier to detect in the visual or audiovi-
sual conditions, but less successfully detected in the verbal 
(transcript) condition (there was no difference in the audio-
only condition).
Assuming that the motivational impairment effect also 
applies to linguistic cues as a form of verbal behavior, we 
hypothesized that highly motivated liars might try harder to 
control their words, so differences between liars and truth-
tellers should become smaller under Research Questions 1, 
2, 3a, 3c, and 5.
Production Mode
Participants’ accounts were handwritten, typed on a key-
board, or spoken (and audio- or videotaped). Horowitz and 
Newman (1964) proposed that, in general, speaking is easier 
than writing, because speakers have more liberty and feel 
less inhibited than writers. Also, writing involves more delib-
erateness (see also Hancock, Woodworth, & Goorha, 2010) 
and more serious commitment. Horowitz and Newman found 
support for their hypothesis in that speaking is more produc-
tive and elaborative than writing. This resulted in more 
words, more phrases, and more sentences when speaking 
than when writing. More recently, Kellogg (2007) hypothe-
sized that writing is slower and less practiced than speaking 
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and thus results in higher demands on working memory. He 
found that accounts of a recalled story were more complete 
and more accurate when spoken than written (cf. also 
Sauerland & Sporer, 2011).
Hence, we hypothesized that liars produce even fewer 
words, diverse words, and sentences (Research Question 1—
Cognitive Load) when writing than speaking due to an 
increased cognitive load and decreased working memory 
capacity. Furthermore, liars should also use fewer sensory 
and contextual details when writing than speaking compared 
with truth-tellers (Research Question 5; see Elntib, Wagstaff, 
& Wheatcroft, 2014, for a recent empirical investigation of 
this issue). Regarding emotion-related cues (under Research 
Questions 3a and 3c), we hypothesized that liars use more 
negative and unspecified emotion words than truth-tellers 
when speaking than when writing, because emotions might 
be expressed more directly and frequently in direct speech.
An empirical issue for studies involving writing is whether 
handwriting or typing comes easier. Therefore, we separated 
written accounts into handwritten versus typed for our mod-
erator analysis. Unfortunately, we do not know the level of 
typing skill of participants.
To sum up, differences between liars and truth-tellers 
should be more pronounced in written (typed or handwritten) 
compared with orally given accounts for linguistic cues 
under Research Questions 1 (cognitive load) and 5 (details), 
whereas for emotion-related cues (Research Questions 3a 
and 3c), the effect sizes should be larger if stories were spo-
ken than written.
Program Type
Researchers from various fields used different computer pro-
grams to analyze deceptive and truthful accounts. The most 
common one is LIWC. Although it is a general program (i.e., 
not specifically designed to detect deception), we separated 
it from other general programs such as Coh-Metrix or 
WordScan. This is because LIWC was used in a dispropor-
tionally large number of studies. Other software, such as 
Agent99Analyzer or ADAM, was specifically developed to 
detect deception. We hypothesized that studies applying 
deception-specific programs should yield stronger effects for 
any linguistic cue than studies using LIWC or any other gen-
eral program based on simple word counts.
Publication Status
The tendency that studies with nonsignificant findings are 
less likely to be written, submitted, and accepted for publica-
tion in peer-reviewed journals, is referred to as publication 
bias (H. Cooper, 2010; Sutton, 2009). In short, the publica-
tion of a study may partially depend on its results rather than 
on its theoretical or methodological quality (Rothstein, 
Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). One method to statistically 
quantify a publication bias is to compare the effect sizes of 
published and unpublished studies (see Appendix E in 
supplemental online materials); another is to test for the 
association between effect sizes and sample sizes (Levine, 
Asada, & Carpenter, 2009).
Experimental Design
We also assessed experimental design as a moderator 
(between- vs. within-participants), assuming larger effects 
for the latter (see results in Appendix F in supplemental 
online materials).
Goals of the Meta-Analysis
The main goals of our meta-analysis were (a) to provide a 
comprehensive set of operational definitions for each lin-
guistic marker, (b) to offer an elaborate theoretical back-
ground to specify directed predictions for each cue, (c) to 
provide a quantitative and comprehensive synthesis of lin-
guistic cues to deception assessed with computer programs 
obtained from interdisciplinary research areas, and (d) to 
analyze the influence of important theoretical and method-
ological moderator variables on the outcome of linguistic 
cues to deception.
Method
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Studies had to meet the following eligibility criteria to be 
included in our meta-analysis: (a) use of software to locate 
linguistic cues; (b) reports of specific linguistic cues (not just 
paraverbal/paralinguistic or nonverbal or physiological 
cues)—studies that reported word counts only, but no other 
linguistic cues were excluded5; (c) independence of data sets: 
when analyses of the same data set of transcripts and cues 
were reported in multiple publications, we only included the 
source published in the journal with the highest publication 
standard (e.g., peer review) and excluded the other source(s) 
to ensure independence of all data sets; and (d) sufficiency of 
data to calculate effect sizes (see “Effect Size Measure” sec-
tion below). Furthermore, (e) whenever a field study with 
statements from real criminal cases met the aforementioned 
criteria (e.g., ten Brinke & Porter, 2012), special care was 
taken to assure ground truth had not been established solely 
on the basis of a court verdict, but in addition from more than 
one type of external and independent source of evidence 
(e.g., physical evidence, witness statements, confessions, 
etc.). However, these studies should be treated with caution 
because linguistic aspects of the account may have affected 
the final case disposition (e.g., lie or truth).
Literature Search and Study Retrieval
As a first step, we searched through reference lists of most 
relevant studies or reviews (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Newman et al., 2003; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; Zhou 
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et al., 2004). Next, several exhaustive literature searches 
were conducted from September 2011 to February 2012 in 
the most important psychological research literature data-
bases, such as the Social Sciences Citation Index (with cited 
reference search), PsycInfo, Dissertation Abstracts, and 
Google Scholar, examining articles published between 1945 
and February 2012.
The combination and permutations of three keyword clus-
ters were used: (a) decept*, deceit, lie; (b) verbal, linguistic, 
language; and (c) automatic, computer, software, artificial. 
These searches resulted in 948 published and unpublished 
articles that were reduced to 394 after removing duplicates. 
Then, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were carefully 
applied. This reduced the number of articles to 99, from 
which we still had to exclude 54 for different reasons (see 
Appendix G in supplemental online materials), mostly 
incomplete reporting of data necessary for our analysis. This 
resulted in 44 relevant data sets that met all inclusion 
criteria.
Linguistic Cues to Deception
A total of 202 linguistic cues were extracted from the articles 
and sorted based on their name and operational definition (if 
available). In some cases, we merged cues with different 
names that had very similar operational definitions. For 
example, type-token ratio, unique words, lexical diversity, or 
different words, were all similarly operationally defined and 
refer to the same construct. We chose the name most com-
monly used (e.g., type-token ratio in the prior example).
All linguistic cues had to be calculated as a ratio of all 
other words (except raw frequencies of words, verbs, and 
sentences), and had to be investigated in at least k = 4 hypoth-
esis tests. This resulted in 79 linguistic cues of which 50 
were allocated to one of the six research questions based on 
their content and theoretical meaning. The remaining 29 cues 
could not be allocated to a theory or one of the research ques-
tions and were assigned to the miscellaneous category. All 
linguistic cues, with all of their names and final operational 
definitions, are listed in Appendices A and B.
Effect Size Measure
As an effect size measure, we used Hedges’s g
u
 (Borenstein, 
2009; Hedges, 1981; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), an unbiased 
estimator of the standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d). 
Here, it is the standardized mean difference of the average 
frequency or ratio for each linguistic cue between deceptive 
and true accounts. If a specific linguistic cue occurred more 
often during deception than truth, g
u
 has a negative sign. If it 
occurred more often during truth than deception, g
u
 was 
assigned a positive value. To calculate g
u
, we coded means, 
standard deviations, and ns separately for deceptive and true 
stories. If this information was not given, other appropriate 
measures (t- or F-values with 1 degree of freedom in the 
numerator, or p values) were coded (for formula collections, 
see Borenstein, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
If no relevant statistical data were available, we e-mailed 
the researchers to request them. In some instances, there may 
be discrepancies between the effect sizes reported here and 
those in the original articles. Reasons for such differences are 
that some authors provided us with more (differentiated) 
data, that we sometimes chose specific subgroups for the 
analyses, or calculated the average effect size across sub-
groups, as explained in more detail under “Meta-Analytic 
Techniques” section below.
Independent Variables and Moderator Variables
After coding typical study characteristics (e.g., study ID, 
author names, year of publication, number of senders and 
gender, etc.), we coded for information that defined the mod-
erator variables or further independent variables of potential 
interest. These were publication status (e.g., published, the-
sis, etc.), type of computer program (LIWC; other general 
programs like Wordscan, Microsoft Word, or Coh-Metrix; or 
specific programs like ADAM, Agent99Analyzer, GATE, 
iSkim, CueCal, or Connexor), language of accounts, theory 
presented (if any), cue selection (a priori, reported all or sig-
nificant cues only), age of the senders, experimental design 
(between- or within-participants), preparation time, event 
type, event valence, interaction between sender and receiver, 
mode of production, and type/level of motivation to lie 
successfully.
Coding Procedures and Intercoder Reliability
Two trained raters coded all dependent and independent vari-
ables from the articles with a standardized coding manual. 
After discussing two articles as examples and agreeing on 
order of article review, each coder worked independently. 
For 11 continuous variables, intercoder reliabilities were 
highly satisfactory, with all coefficients ranging from 
Pearson’s r = .86 to r = 1.0 (except for preparation time: r = 
.77). For 8 categorical variables, intercoder reliabilities were 
excellent, with Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) ranging from 
.75 to 1.0. For 6 additional categorical variables, Cohen’s 
kappa ranged from .51 to .67, which was still a fair to good 
agreement (according to Fleiss, 1981). The few disagree-
ments were resolved by discussion between the two coders. 
Final coding decisions of the moderator variables for each 
study are displayed in Appendix C.
Meta-Analytic Techniques
Dependencies of effect sizes. In some studies, in addition to 
accounts’ truth status, other independent variables were 
manipulated as between- or within-participants factors and 
the data were reported separately for these subgroups (e.g., 
Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach, 2010: high- vs. 
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low-fantasy-proneness). In studies with additional within-
participants factors, dependency was avoided by calculat-
ing effect sizes separately for each subgroup and averaging 
them to ensure that only one effect size per study per lin-
guistic cue was included (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In two 
other studies, a second between-participants factor (Ali & 
Levine, 2008: denials or confessions; Qin et al., 2005: text 
chat, audio, face-to-face) was examined; here, we included 
each of these subgroups (with different stimulus persons) as 
independent data sets.
Superordinate categories and sub-cues. Sometimes a linguistic 
category of cues had differentiated effect sizes that seemed to 
represent a single construct. As an example, we defined cue 
19 with the superordinate category (“umbrella term”) posi-
tive emotions and feelings including results from positive 
emotions only and positive feelings only. In studies using 
LIWC 2001, positive feelings and positive emotions/affects 
are treated as two different linguistic cues—and the data are 
reported separately for each (in LIWC 2007, they are com-
bined). To ensure that only one effect size per construct is 
included, we combined sub-cues to a superordinate category 
(by averaging their effect sizes). However, we also calcu-
lated separate meta-analyses for each of these sub-cues (here: 
cue 19.1 positive emotions only and 19.2 positive feelings 
only) to investigate whether the results are more differenti-
ated, or if merging these cues was justifiable. The same pro-
cedure was applied to cue 18 negative emotions and to cue 28 
sensory–perceptual processes (see Table 1). These superor-
dinate categories make results from LIWC more comparable 
with studies using other computer programs that did not dif-
ferentiate between different sub-cues (e.g., anger, anxiety, 
sadness).
Weighted average effect size. For each of the 79 linguistic 
cues, individual meta-analyses under the fixed-effects model 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Shadish & Haddock, 2009; Sporer 
& Cohn, 2011) were calculated. Average effect sizes were 
weighted by the inverse of the variance to give more weight 
to studies with larger samples. For six studies, the total num-
ber of accounts was extremely large. To avoid unjustified 
extraordinary large weights, we adjusted the number of total 
accounts for these studies (see “Results” section).
Homogeneity of effect sizes. We report both the homogeneity 
test statistic Q (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and the descriptive 
homogeneity statistic I2 (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Shad-
ish & Haddock, 2009). In rare cases where I2 resulted in a 
negative value, it was set to 0. In case of heterogeneity, out-
lier and moderator analyses were conducted.
Outlier analysis. To test for the presence of outliers, we 
applied the two methods recommended by Hedges and Olkin 
(1985, chap. 12, and programmed by the fourth author). The 
number of outliers did not exceed 15% of the total number of 
effect sizes to avoid an artificial restriction of the variance 
between effect sizes. If outliers were detected, we calculated 
each meta-analysis with and without the outliers as sensitiv-
ity analyses (Greenhouse & Iyengar, 2009). Due to space 
limitations, we only report results without outliers in Table 1 
(results with and without outliers are displayed in Appendix 
H in supplemental online materials).
Moderator analyses. We used categorical variables as poten-
tial moderators with Hedges’s analogue to ANOVA (Hedges, 
1982; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Moderator analyses were 
only conducted if the homogeneity statistic was significant 
and if an individual meta-analysis of a specific linguistic cue 
contained enough hypothesis tests to avoid empty cell sizes 
and to increase power. Moderator analyses were only con-
ducted without outliers to prevent biased results. To clarify 
potential confounds between moderator variables, we calcu-
lated their intercorrelations as well as all two-way and three-
way cross-tabulations for each variable combination, to 
avoid empty or low frequency cells. As a consequence, only 
moderator analyses for k ≥ 13 hypothesis tests are reported.
Computer software for calculations. For computing individual 
effect sizes, weights, and confidence intervals (CIs), formu-
lae were programmed in Microsoft Office Excel (2011) 
spreadsheets by the first and fourth author. Calculations of 
meta-analyses and outlier analyses were conducted using 
Excel spreadsheets programmed by the fourth author and 
cross-validated using Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) SPSS 
macros (Wilson, 2002). Moderator analyses were also con-
ducted using these macros.
Results and Discussion
Study Characteristics
We included k = 44 independent studies or data sets (see 
Appendix C for all individual coding decisions), dated 
between 2002 and February 2012. Most studies were pub-
lished (k = 27), 11 were conference presentations (poster or 
paper), and the rest were 4 dissertations, 1 master’s thesis, 
and 1 submitted manuscript.
Computer program. More than half of the studies (58.1%) 
used LIWC (2001 or 2007), 23.3% used other general pro-
grams, and 18.6% applied a program specifically developed 
to detect deception. Three studies, where the type of program 
was not specifically described or labeled (e.g., “automated 
analysis method,” “natural language processing tool,” “mes-
sage analyzing software”), were categorized under other 
general programs.
Senders. There were a total of 3,780 senders (k = 43) with an 
average of 87.91 (SD = 19.60, Mdn = 53) senders per study, 
ranging from 8 to 800. Information about senders’ gender 
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was provided in 30 studies, with more male than female par-
ticipants in total (Nmale = 1,254, Nfemale = 895), and on average 
per study (Mmale = 41.80, SDmale = 9.22; Mfemale = 29.83, 
SDfemale = 5.76). Exact information about senders’ age was 
reported in only 29.5% of the studies. Across all age groups, 
senders’ mean age was 19.33 years (SD = 8.45), ranging 
from 4 to 58 years. The mean age of N = 1,015 adults only 
was 24.17 (SD = 4.11) with a range of 17 to 58 years, whereas 
the mean age of N = 218 children (k = 4) was 8.45 years 
(SD = 1.57), ranging from 4 to 14 years.
Accounts. There were a total of 11,680 (N
truth
 = 5,650, N
lie
 = 
6,030) accounts originally. However, six studies contained 
an extremely large number of accounts, ranging from N = 
608 (Schafer, 2007, Experiment 1) to N = 3,162 (Derrick 
et al., 2012), with a mean of 1295.17 accounts (SD = 948.98). 
In the other 38 studies, the mean was M = 102.87 (SD = 
73.17), ranging from N = 13 (Ali & Levine, 2008, confes-
sions) to N = 322 (J. E. Cooper, 2008). Therefore, we decided 
to adjust the number of total accounts for these six studies to 
N = 500 (n
truth
 = 250, n
lie
 = 250) to avoid extraordinary high 
weights. Consequently, the final average number of accounts 
per study was M = 157.02 (SD = 153.66, Mdn = 103), with 
M = 82.02 (SD = 80.71) for truths and M = 75.00 (SD = 
76.68) for lies. All accounts were provided in English except 
for four studies (two Spanish, one Dutch, one Arabic).
Preparation. Only eight studies provided information about 
how long senders had time to prepare their accounts. In four 
of these, senders had no opportunity, for the other four stud-
ies, senders had on average 1.31 min (SD = 0.71; range = 1-5 
min) to prepare.
Theoretical background. Twelve studies referred to Newman 
et al.’s (2003) explanations (“LIWC approach”) to predict 
the outcome of specific linguistic cues, 3 used interpersonal 
deception theory (IDT; Buller & Burgoon, 1996), 2 RM 
(Sporer, 2004), and 12 a combination of IDT and RM. Twelve 
additional studies referred to other theoretical backgrounds, 
for example, media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986) or 
verbal immediacy (Mehrabian & Wiener, 1966), and three 
studies did not mention any theory at all. A priori selections 
of linguistic cues were made for 37 studies while 7 reported 
only significant findings.
Interpretation of Effect Sizes
As a rule of thumb, Cohen (1988) classified the effect size d 
into three categories, with d = 0.20 as small, d = 0.50 as 
medium and d = 0.80 as large effect sizes. However, in meta-
analyses about cues to deception, effect sizes are often much 
smaller (DePaulo et al., 2003: Mdn g
u
 = 0.10; similarly low 
for Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). Richard, Bond, and 
Stokes-Zoota (2003) examined 322 meta-analyses in social 
psychology and provided an empirically based effect size 
distribution that might serve as a good comparison for our 
results (cf. Sporer & Cohn, 2011). It should be noted that in 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis, positive effect sizes 
refer to stronger or more frequent cues in lies.
Research Questions
In this section, we present results for 50 linguistic cues to 
deception grouped according to six research questions (see 
Table 1). The weighted average g
u
, with the 95% CI, is 
reported for all analyses. Recall that positive effect sizes 
denote stronger presence in true accounts (similar to Sporer 
& Schwandt, 2006, 2007, but contrary to DePaulo et al., 
2003). A data file with all dependent and predictor variables 
coded is available in supplemental online materials.
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience 
Greater Cognitive Load?
(a) Are liars’ accounts shorter in terms of number of words (cue 
01), number of sentences (cue 07), and average sentence 
length (cue 08)? As expected, liars used fewer words than 
truth-tellers (word quantity, 0.24 [0.19, 0.29]), with g
u
s rang-
ing from −1.25 to 1.43, but no shorter sentences than truth-
tellers (average sentence length, 0.05 [−0.03, 0.13]). 
Contrary to our prediction, liars used more sentences than 
truth-tellers (−0.33 [−0.44, −0.21]), although the distribution 
of effect sizes was also quite heterogeneous. The effect size 
for sentence quantity was derived from a small subset of nine 
studies compared with 42 studies serving data for word 
quantity. Therefore, word quantity is a more precise estimate 
for statement length.
Note that DePaulo et al. (2003) did not examine number 
of words per se but only response length defined as “length 
or duration” (cue 01, d = −0.03, k = 49, ns), or as talking time 
(cue 02, d = −0.35, k = 4, p < .05). Sporer and Schwandt 
(2006) found no reliable associations for number of words 
(d = −0.018, k = 8) nor for message duration (d = −0.078, k = 
23). These differences in findings may be due to the stimulus 
accounts used. More recent studies analyzing verbal content 
cues to deception sometimes do (e.g., Ansarra et al., 2011) 
and sometimes do not find (e.g., Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2013) differences between liars’ and 
truth-tellers’ length of accounts operationalized by the num-
ber of words.
(b) Are deceptive accounts less elaborated in terms of content 
word diversity (cue 02), type-token ratio (cue 03), or word 
length cues (cues 04, 05)? Indeed, liars used fewer diverse 
content words (0.48 [0.34, 0.61]) and distinct words (type-
token ratio: 0.14 [0.07, 0.21]) than truth-tellers. These find-
ings could be attributed to liars’ increased cognitive load and 
reduced working memory capacity (relative to truth-tellers), 
which in turn is associated with a limitation of creative word 
production in speaking or writing. These findings also favor 
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a cognitive over a social-psychological explanation, as it is 
unlikely that liars strategically use fewer diverse content and 
distinct words. However, the prediction that liars would pro-
vide shorter words was not supported (see Table 1). Presum-
ably, the number of distinct words and word diversity indices 
are more sensitive to cognitive load and working memory 
capacity than word length.
(c) Are deceptive accounts less complex than true accounts, as 
indicated by fewer verbs (cue 06), causation (cue 09), and 
exclusive words (cue 10)? Liars indeed used fewer exclu-
sive words like but, except, or without, than truth-tellers 
(0.24 [0.17, 0.31]). Using few exclusive words results in 
simpler stories (Newman et al., 2003). Liars may resort to 
telling simple stories because their cognitive system is more 
taxed than that of truth-tellers. Our predictions that liars 
would use fewer words assigning a cause to his or her 
behavior (causation), or use fewer verbs than truth-tellers, 
were not confirmed (Table 1).
(d) Do liars commit more writing errors (cue 11) than truth-
tellers? No support was found for this hypothesis with or 
without two outliers (Lee, Welker, & Odom, 2009; Zhou & 
Zhang, 2004). This can be reconciled with DePaulo’s self-
presentational perspective (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 
2003). Liars might be more self-aware and deliberate than 
truth-tellers; hence, they may edit their typing errors. Derrick 
et al. (2012) showed that liars were significantly more likely 
to edit their words on the keyboard (e.g., in using the back-
space and delete button) than truth-tellers (−0.12 [−0.19, 
−0.05]). Whether their edits were aimed at correcting explicit 
typing errors was not investigated and should be examined 
more closely. In 6 of the 10 studies exploring writing errors, 
participants typed their stories on a computer keyboard; 
unfortunately, they did not measure editing behavior (with 
the exception of Derrick et al., 2012).
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than 
Truth-Tellers?
Effects for certainty and modal verbs were not significant. 
The difference between DePaulo et al.’s (2003) findings (who 
found liars to appear more verbally and vocally uncertain: cue 
31, k = 10, d = 0.30, p < .05) and ours could be due to different 
operationalizations. Whereas we included studies that auto-
matically counted words expressing certainty, DePaulo et al. 
considered the subjective impression of uncertainty (“the 
speaker seems uncertain, insecure, . . .,” p. 114). The oppos-
ing findings suggest that (a) there is a difference between 
objective and subjective assessments of (un)certainty, and/or 
(b) liars may nonverbally give the impression of being uncer-
tain without using fewer certainty words than truth-tellers.
Contrary to our prediction, deceptive accounts contained 
slightly fewer tentative words (such as may, seem, perhaps) 
than truthful accounts (0.13 [0.06, 0.20]; for an exception, see 
ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). A reason for this unexpected find-
ing could be that liars think that tentative expressions diminish 
their credibility and therefore try to avoid them, although we 
are not aware of any empirical evidence that liars pursue this 
strategy to appear more credible. Note that DePaulo et al. 
(2003) also reported less “tentative constructions” (cue 30, k = 
3, d = −0.16, ns) in lies. A different explanation for this finding 
could be derived from the literature on credibility assessment 
(e.g., Steller & Köhnken, 1989). The underlying assumption is 
that due to their motivation to appear credible, liars (here, 
alleged victims of sexual abuse) would probably not correct 
themselves spontaneously, admit a lack of memory, or raise 
doubts about their own statement. These criteria relate to 
uncertainty or tentative words to the extent that liars try to hide 
any kind of deficiencies or ambiguities in their statement to 
appear or stay credible (Sporer, 2004). Especially the criterion 
“admitting lack of memory” is less often expressed by liars 
than truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003; cue 73, k = 5, d = 
−0.42, p < .05; Vrij, 2005). Research also shows that guilty 
suspects attempt to be firm in their denial of guilt (Hartwig 
et al., 2007); this is contrary to showing uncertainty.
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More 
Negations and Negative Emotion Words?
(a) To the extent that liars defend themselves or deny something 
they have done, do they use more negation terms such as no, 
never, or not (cue 17)? This prediction was supported, with 
a significant negative effect of −0.15 [−0.22, −0.09] based on 
20 studies (but large heterogeneity). Our results contradict 
Hancock, Curry, Goorha, and Woodworth’s (2008) view, 
who considered negations as a form of distinction marker (in 
addition to exclusive terms) expected to occur less frequently 
in deceptive accounts, presumably to avoid contradictions by 
being less specific than truth-tellers.
Our findings concur with those of DePaulo et al. (2003), 
who found a significant effect for negative statements and 
complaints (cue 52, d = 0.21, k = 9, p < .05) showing that 
liars use slightly more negative utterances than truth-tellers.
(b) Do liars use more negative emotion words in general (cues 
18, 18.1), as well as more specific negative emotion words, such 
as anger (cue 18.2), anxiety (cue 18.3), or sadness (cue 18.4), 
than truth-tellers? Contrary to the prediction that people 
might feel negative emotions while lying (Ekman, 2001; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981), liars did not use more negative 
emotion words (cue 18, −0.07 [−0.15, 0.01]). However, the 
sub-cue negative emotions only revealed a small but reliable 
negative effect (−0.18 [−0.24, −0.12]).6 The difference 
between these results can be explained with their different 
operationalization. Whereas the superordinate category neg-
ative emotions (cue 18) contained all types of negative emo-
tions (including anger, anxiety, and sadness), cue 18.1 
encompassed only a reduced set of negative emotion words 
(e.g., hate, worthless, enemy).
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A more differentiated picture of various negative emotions 
under investigation emerged when we look at the more spe-
cific type of emotion words used. Liars used more anger terms 
than truth-tellers (cue 18.2, −0.27 [−0.35, −0.19]), although no 
significant differences were found for anxiety (cue 18.3) or 
sadness (cue 18.4, see Table 1). Newman et al.’s (2003) asser-
tion that “anxiety words are more predictive than overall nega-
tive emotion” (p. 672) was not supported. Rather, the present 
findings indicate that there are differences in words expressing 
feelings and/or different negative emotions while lying. Liars 
might not feel anxious or sad but rather feel angry, and this 
might be manifested in words like worthless or annoyed.
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer 
Positive Emotion Words?
Did truth-tellers express more positive emotion (cue 19.1) or 
positive feeling (cue 19.2) words than liars? Although the 
effect for positive emotions only just missed significance 
(−0.07 [−0.15, 0.00]), overall, there was no support for this 
prediction (Table 1). DePaulo and colleagues (2003) also did 
not find a significant effect for being friendly and pleasant 
(cue 49, d = −0.16, k = 6, ns).
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or 
Less Unspecified Emotion Words?
For 21 studies investigating unspecified emotion words (cue 
15), liars used more unspecified emotion words than truth-
tellers (−0.11 [−0.19, −0.04]). However, liars and truth-tell-
ers did not differ in words expressing unpleasantness or 
pleasantness (cue 16, −0.10 [−0.25, 0.06]). DePaulo et al. 
(2003) also found no significant difference for being “friendly 
and pleasant” (cue 49, d = −0.16, k = 6, ns). Conversely, 
DePaulo et al.’s findings for two other subjectively rated 
cues associated with pleasantness, namely, “cooperation” 
(cue 50, d = −0.66, k = 3, p < .05) and “facial pleasantness” 
(cue 54, d = −0.12, k = 13, p < .05), showed that truth-tellers 
appeared more pleasant than liars. These differences might 
indicate that the pleasantness construct tracked by DePaulo 
et al.’s human-rated cues (subjective impressions) is differ-
ent from the one operationalized in computer-based studies 
(objective word count). Alternatively, truth-tellers might 
only appear more pleasant than liars in their nonverbal or 
paraverbal behavior, but not in their choice of words.
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance 
Themselves More From Events?
(a) Do liars use fewer first-person pronouns (cues 21, 22, 23) 
and more second-person (cue 24) and third-person pro-
nouns (cue 25) than truth-tellers? Although no significant dif-
ferences were found for first-person singular, or first-person 
plural references (see Table 1), the weighted average effect 
size for total first-person pronouns was significant in the 
expected direction; that is, liars used fewer total first-person 
pronouns than truth-tellers (0.14 [0.06, 0.22], when the 
extreme negative effect size found by Brunet, 2009, both 
conditions: −1.63 [−1.98, −1.29] was excluded).
On the other side of the coin, we predicted second- and 
third-person pronouns to occur more often in liars’ than 
truth-tellers’ accounts. Our meta-analyses supported this pre-
diction, with a negative g
u
 = −0.10 (Table 1). The results 
indicated that liars in general tried to redirect the focus of 
attention to other people by using more references to their 
interaction partner(s) (you), or to (a) third person(s) (he, she, 
they) than truth-tellers.
Overall pronoun use. As researchers seem to be interested in 
the use of any type of pronouns (total pronouns, cue 20), we 
aggregated all of the pronoun effect sizes. The resulting 
effect size was not significant (0.06 [−0.02, 0.14]).
(b) Do deceptive accounts contain more passive voice verbs 
(cue 26) and generalizing terms (cue 27) than truthful 
accounts? Although effect sizes for passive voice verbs var-
ied considerably (see Table 1), all were nonsignificant. This 
is probably due to small sample sizes or a generally low fre-
quency of occurrence (floor effect). Generalizing terms had a 
medium negative effect size (−0.37 [−0.79, 0.05]) that was 
nevertheless not significant because of the small number of 
studies and large heterogeneity. Similarly, DePaulo et al. 
(2003) did not find a significant effect for generalizing terms 
(cue 21, d = 0.10, k = 5, ns).
(c) Do lies include more past tense verbs (cue 47) and fewer 
present tense verbs (cue 48) than true accounts? Significant 
differences were neither found for past tense verbs nor for 
present tense verbs (Table 1). A potential reason why the data 
did not support our predictions could be the way the depen-
dent variable was operationalized. It is important to note that 
Pillemer et al.’s (1998) hypothesis stated that verb tense 
shifts occur more often in critical parts of experienced (i.e., 
true) autobiographical events. Here, we did not consider verb 
tense shifts, but absolute number of present and past tense 
verbs. Future research could construct a more suitable lin-
guistic cue than counting the number of verbs only.
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer 
(Sensory and Contextual) Details?
(a) Do liars use fewer sensory and perceptual details than 
truth-tellers? They did, according to our findings for sensory–
perceptual processes only (cue 28.1), although the average 
effect size was very small (0.06 [0.00, 0.13]). For the vari-
able sensory–perceptual processes overall (cue 28), the 
effect size was not significant (0.05 [−0.01, 0.12], after two 
outliers were excluded).
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Some support came from the more specialized cue hearing 
(cue 28.4, 0.17 [0.09, 0.25]), showing that liars used fewer 
words expressing their acoustic impressions (like listen, 
sound, or speak) than truth-tellers. Indeed, in case of entirely 
fabricated lies (compared to partially fabricated lies or lies of 
omission), persons may not experience any audio(visual) 
impressions at all and do not seem to deliberately include 
these words in their lies. However, the cues seeing (cue 28.2) 
and feeling (cue 28.3) yielded nonsignificant results (see Table 
1). Although DePaulo et al. (2003) also found no significant 
effects for sensory information (cue 05: d = −0.17, k = 4, ns) 
there have been many new RM studies we are currently syn-
thesizing in an updated large scale meta-analysis.
(b) Are liars’ accounts less contextually embedded than those of 
truth-tellers, as indicated by fewer time and space words? No 
significant effects emerged for time (cue 29), space (cue 30), 
or the combination of spatial and temporal details (cue 31). 
Our results for temporal and spatial details are in line with 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) nonsignificant finding for contextual 
embedding (cue 76, d = −0.21, k = 6, ns), though it should be 
noted that contextual embedding goes beyond temporal and 
spatial details in that the event has to be connected to every-
day occurrences, habits, relationships, and so forth (e.g., 
Steller & Köhnken, 1989). Again, many newer CBCA and 
RM studies found support for this assumption (see Masip 
et al., 2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008a) but linguistic analyses by 
computers do not seem to capture them.
(c) Relative to truth-tellers, do liars use fewer descriptive words, 
such as prepositions (cue 32), numbers (cue 33), quantifiers 
(cue 34), modifiers (adverbs and adjectives, cue 35), and motion 
verbs (cue 36)? The only significant effect size was obtained 
for quantifiers (0.14 [0.02, 0.25]) indicating a slightly lower 
use of words such as all, bit, few, less, among liars. However, 
this finding was synthesized from four studies only, so we 
should not make strong conclusions for this cue in general.
Interestingly, liars produced more motion verbs (such as 
walk, go, or move) than truth-tellers (−0.09 [−0.17, −0.01]) 
after removing the only significant positive effect size (Liu 
et al., 2012; 0.38 [0.21, 0.56]), which was found to be an 
outlier. This finding is contrary to our prediction but is in 
line with the cognitive load approach (Research Question 1) 
and Newman et al.’s (2003) assumption that, when con-
structing a lie, “simple, concrete actions are easier to string 
together than false evaluations” (p. 667). Therefore, liars, 
who are cognitively taxed by the act of lying, “should use 
more motion verbs and fewer exclusive words” (Newman 
et al., 2003, p. 667).
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less Often 
to Cognitive Processes?
As predicted, weighted average effect sizes for both cues 
(37 and 38) were significantly positive (see Table 1), 
indicating that liars expressed words relating to their inner 
thoughts (insight) and cognitive processes less often than 
truth-tellers.
Miscellaneous Category
Twenty-nine cues that could not be allocated to any research 
question were subsumed under the miscellaneous category. 
As displayed in Appendix D (in supplemental online materi-
als), significant positive effect sizes (without outliers) were 
obtained for inhibition, humans, and for three cues express-
ing biological processes, namely, biology, physical states, 
and eating. Liars used fewer words from all of these word 
classes than truth-tellers. In contrast, negative effect sizes for 
future tense and leisure terms indicated that these terms 
occurred more frequently in deceptive than truthful accounts.
Moderator Analyses
Due to the large number of potential moderator analyses for 
all linguistic cues, we only report significant findings (all 
Q
B
s were significant at p < .05) for both theoretically and 
methodologically important moderator variables. 
Specifically, we examined six moderator variables for 25 lin-
guistic cues, with each analysis containing at least 13 stud-
ies.7 Note that the overall number of studies is smaller for the 
moderator analyses as many studies did not report enough 
information to code them. Analyses of two additional mod-
erators, experimental design (between- vs. within-partici-
pants) and publication status, are available in supplemental 
online materials (Appendices E and F). Also, it must be 
acknowledged that blocking groups of studies in meta-anal-
yses analogous to ANOVA often introduces confounds (see 
Pigott, 2012) although we have taken great care to minimize 
them (see “Method” section).
Event type and personal involvement. We hypothesized that 
larger effect sizes would be found for Research Questions 1, 
2, 3a, 3c, and 4 if the event was personally relevant to the 
participant (“First-person experience,” k = 21) than in the 
“Attitude/liking” paradigm (k = 7) or the “Miscellaneous” 
paradigms (k = 14; see Table 2). First, concerning cognitive 
load (Research Question 1), event type affected average sen-
tence length only. Liars used shorter sentences than truth-
tellers when articulating attitudes (0.17), but not under the 
other two paradigms. Second, regarding negative emotions 
and negations (Research Question 3a), liars used more nega-
tive emotion words than truth-tellers only if they had to tell a 
personally relevant story (−0.37, −0.57), and expressed more 
negations only in miscellaneous paradigms (−0.59). Thus, 
although liars might experience and express more negative 
emotions when the topic is personally relevant, they do not 
necessarily use more negations. Third, as expected, liars also 
expressed more unspecified emotions (Research Question 
3c; −0.45) when talking about a personal experience than 
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when having performed other tasks. Fourth, concerning dis-
tancing (Research Question 4), liars used fewer first-person 
plural pronouns primarily when describing a video (0.38), 
but fewer total first-person pronouns when talking about 
attitudes (0.31). This unexpected finding suggests that it may 
be especially hard for liars to refer to themselves while artic-
ulating a false attitude; however, liars may still use self-ref-
erences while telling a personal event because it is common 
(in the English language) to refer to oneself as the actor. 
Also, it would be hard to avoid self-references when telling a 
story with oneself as the acting person, even when lying.
Liars used more total second-person pronouns only when 
talking about attitudes (−0.18), and more total third-person 
pronouns in all kinds of events except the miscellaneous 
paradigms. In general, thus, the predicted differences for 
Distancing (Research Question 4) between liars and truth-
tellers appear enhanced in the attitude/liking paradigm—
compared with the other two paradigms.
Emotional valence. We predicted effects for cues under 
Research Questions 1 to 4 to be larger for negative (k = 18) 
than for neutral events or themes (k = 17; see Table 3).8 
Indeed, liars used fewer words (Research Question 
1—Cognitive Load; 0.54) only when the event was negative. 
In terms of negative emotions (Research Question 3a), liars 
also used considerably more negations (−0.42) and negative 
emotions (−0.39, −0.65) than truth-tellers, most notably 
when the event was negative. This supported the notion that 
telling a negatively toned lie might be accompanied by nega-
tive emotions.
However, contrary to our predictions regarding the cogni-
tive load cues (Research Question 1), differences between 
lies and truths for type-token ratio (0.32) and exclusive words 
(0.47) were larger when telling a neutral event rather than a 
negative event. Perhaps truth-tellers reporting a negative 
event are as emotionally involved as liars. This may imply 
using less elaborate language (compared with neutral events), 
which would explain the lack of difference in type-token 
ratio between liars and truth-tellers. Finally, no difference in 
the use of unspecified emotions (Research Question 3c) was 
found between neutral and negative topics: Liars used more 
emotion words overall for both (−0.54, −0.45).
Regarding distancing (Research Question 4), somewhat 
contradictory findings occurred for self-references. When 
telling neutral events, liars used more first-person singular 
pronouns (−0.25) but fewer total first-person pronouns 
Table 3. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When the Emotional Valence of the Event Was Neutral Versus Negative.
Linguistic cue (RQ) k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
Neutral k
2
Negative
01 Word quantity (RQ1) 33 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] 17 0.04 [−0.03, 0.12] 16 0.54 [0.45, 0.62]
03 Type-token ratio (RQ1) 20 0.26 [0.18, 0.33] 11 0.32 [0.24, 0.41] 9 0.04 [−0.12, 0.19]
10 Exclusive words (RQ1) 14 0.38 [0.29, 0.46] 8 0.47 [0.36, 0.59] 6 0.26 [0.11, 0.38]
17 Negations (RQ3a) 14 −0.30 [−0.38, −0.21] 8 −0.13 [−0.26, 0.01] 6 −0.42 [−0.53, −0.31]
18 Negative emotions (RQ3a) 17 −0.26 [−0.35, −0.18] 10 −0.16 [−0.28, −0.05] 7 −0.39 [−0.52, −0.26]
18.1 Negative emotions onlywO (RQ3a) 17 −0.41 [−0.50, −0.32] 10 −0.22 [−0.34, −0.10] 7 −0.65 [−0.79, −0.52]
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 18 −0.50 [−0.58, −0.42] 8 −0.54 [−0.65, −0.43] 10 −0.45 [−0.57, −0.33]
21 First-person singularwO (RQ4) 15 −0.04 [−0.12, 0.05] 9 −0.25 [−0.36, −0.13] 6 0.27 [0.14, 0.40]
23 Total first-personwO (RQ4) 17 0.10 [0.01, 0.20] 8 0.22 [0.10, 0.34] 9 −0.13 [−0.30, 0.05]
24 Total second-personwO (RQ4) 15 −0.20 [−0.28, −0.12] 9 −0.40 [−0.50, −0.29] 6 0.09 [−0.05, 0.22]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; g
u
 = ES Hedges’s gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without Outlier; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond 
to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates 
under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
Table 2. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When Studies Used Different Type of Events and Personal Involvement.
Linguistic cue (RQ) k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
Attitude/liking paradigm k
3
First-person experience k
2
Miscellaneous paradigms
08 Average sentence lengthwO (RQ1) 15 0.04 [−0.04, 0.12] 2 0.17 [0.05, 0.29] 8 −0.07 [−0.20, 0.06] 5 −0.07 [−0.17, 0.13]
17 Negations (RQ3a) 20 −0.15 [−0.22, −0.08] 7 0.08 [−0.02, 0.18] 7 −0.08 [−0.20, 0.05] 6 −0.59 [−0.71, −0.47]
18 Negative emotionsa (RQ3a) 24 −0.13 [−0.19, −0.06] 7 0.03 [−0.06, 0.13] 10 −0.37 [−0.48, −0.25] 7 −0.10 [−0.24, 0.03]
18.1 Negative emotions only (RQ3a) 24 −0.17 [−0.24, −0.11] 7 0.06 [−0.04, 0.15] 10 −0.57 [−0.69, −0.45] 7 −0.11 [−0.25, 0.03]
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 24 −0.21 [−0.27, −0.14] 7 −0.08 [−0.17, 0.02] 12 −0.45 [−0.56, −0.34] 5 −0.02 [−0.19, 0.15]
22 First-person plural (RQ4) 24 0.08 [0.01, 0.14] 7 0.09 [−0.01, 0.19] 12 −0.08 [−0.18, 0.03] 5 0.38 [0.23, 0.53]
23 Total first-personwO (RQ4) 22 0.14 [0.06, 0.22] 6 0.31 [0.19, 0.42] 11 −0.11 [−0.27, 0.05] 5 0.10 [−0.05, 0.26]
24 Total second-person (RQ4) 22 −0.04 [−0.01, 0.03] 7 −0.18 [−0.27, −0.08] 10 0.09 [−0.02, 0.20] 5 0.09 [−0.09, 0.26]
25 Total third-person (RQ4) 28 −0.11 [−0.17, −0.05] 7 −0.12 [−0.21, −0.02] 13 −0.22 [−0.32, −0.12] 8 0.06 [−0.07, 0.18]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; g
u
 = ES Hedges’s gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without outlier; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond 
to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates 
under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
aIndicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term.
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(0.22) than truth-tellers. Also, when telling negative events, 
liars used fewer first-person singular pronouns than truth-
tellers (0.27) but about the same amount of total first-person 
pronouns (−0.13). These findings clearly show that (a) dif-
ferences exist between liars and truth-tellers in terms of 
referring solely to oneself or to oneself in addition to one’s 
group, and (b) these differences depend on the valence of the 
event. If we think about examples of wrongdoing as typical 
negative events, it perfectly makes sense to distribute respon-
sibility to “we” (or “you and me,” “they and me”) than to 
take it on one’s own shoulders (“I”). Finally, liars expressed 
more total second-person pronouns only when the event was 
neutral (−0.40).
Intensity of interaction. We predicted that the higher the interac-
tion level, the larger the effect sizes would be (Table 4). Indeed, 
effect sizes for word count (Research Question 1—Cognitive 
Load; 0.69), negative emotions (Research Question 3a; −0.48, 
−0.79), unspecified emotions (Research Question 3c; −0.63), 
and first-person singular pronouns (Research Question 4—
Distancing; 0.34) were largest in person to person interactions. 
Note also that for computer-mediated communication the 
direction of effect (−0.41) reversed compared with other con-
ditions. Furthermore, in the interview condition (which was 
considered as the second intense interaction category), effect 
sizes for word count, exclusive words, and negative emotions 
only, were in the expected direction. Interestingly, when no 
interaction took place, liars used significantly more first-per-
son singular pronouns (−0.22) and total third-person pro-
nouns than truth-tellers (−0.31).
Together, this evidence suggests that some verbal differ-
ences between liars and truth-tellers manifest themselves 
most when a bidirectional interaction between two persons—
not only a one-way interview—took place.
Motivation. In support for our hypotheses, larger effects 
occurred for not-motivated liars, who used fewer words 
(Research Question 1—Cognitive Load) than truth-tellers 
(0.47), compared with moderately (0.19) or highly motivated 
liars (0.18; see Table 5). Also, liars used fewer temporal 
details (Research Question 5 regarding details) only when no 
motivation was induced (0.20). These findings support the 
notion that highly motivated liars are more successful than 
unmotivated liars in controlling their verbal behavior (at 
Table 5. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When Studies Induced Different Levels of Motivation.
Linguistic cue (RQ) k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
No motivation k
2
Low to medium motivation k
3
High motivation
01 Word quantity (RQ1) 37 0.27 [0.21, 0.32] 11 0.47 [0.36, 0.57] 22 0.19 [0.12, 0.26] 4 0.18 [0.04, 0.31]
03 Type-token ratio (RQ1) 19 0.00 [−0.08, 0.08] 4 −0.17 [−0.39, 0.05] 12 −0.12 [−0.21, −0.02] 3 0.67 [0.47, 0.87]
08 Average sentence lengthwO (RQ1) 13 0.08 [−0.01, 0.16] 5 0.09 [−0.09, 0.28] 6 0.15 [0.04, 0.26] 2 −0.21 [−0.42, 0.01]
18 Negative emotionsa (RQ3a) 21 −0.14 [−0.21, −0.07] 6 −0.19 [−0.36, −0.03] 13 −0.01 [−0.10, 0.07] 2 −0.56 [−0.74, −0.39]
18.1 Negative emotions only (RQ3a) 21 −0.20 [−0.27, −0.13] 6 −0.20 [−0.37, −0.03] 13 0.00 [−0.09, 0.09] 2 −1.03 [−1.21, −0.86]
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 23 −0.22 [−0.29, −0.15] 4 −0.20 [−0.42, 0.01] 15 −0.10 [−0.19, −0.02] 4 −0.53 [−0.66, −0.39]
28 Sensory–perceptual processesa (RQ5) 25 0.08 [0.02, 0.15] 7 −0.22 [−0.39, −0.06] 15 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] 3 0.21 [0.07, 0.35]
28.1 Sensory–perceptual processes only (RQ5) 25 0.08 [0.02, 0.15] 7 −0.29 [−0.45, −0.13] 15 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] 3 0.25 [0.12, 0.38]
29 TimewO (RQ5) 21 0.03 [−0.05, 0.10] 4 0.20 [0.01, 0.40] 15 −0.02 [−0.10, 0.07] 2 0.09 [−0.12, 0.30]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; g
u
 = ES Hedges’s gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without outlier; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond 
to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates 
under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
aIndicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term.
Table 4. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When Studies Applied Different Type of Interaction Levels (Between Sender and 
Receiver).
Linguistic cue (RQ) k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
No interaction k
2
Computer-mediated 
communication k
3
Interview k
4
Person-to-person 
interaction
01 Word quantity (RQ1) 37 0.22 [0.17, 0.28] 13 0.14 [0.07, 0.21] 5 −0.41 [−0.65, −0.18] 16 0.35 [0.23, 0.46] 3 0.69 [0.53, 0.85]
10 Exclusive words (RQ1) 19 0.30 [0.23, 0.36] 9 0.37 [0.29, 0.45] 2 −0.02 [−0.31, 0.26] 6 0.25 [0.04, 0.46] 2 0.17 [0.02, 0.33]
18 Negative emotionsa (RQ3a) 22 −0.14 [−0.21, −0.07] 8 0.03 [−0.07, 0.12] 3 −0.18 [−0.46, 0.10] 7 −0.16 [−0.34, 0.01] 4 −0.48 [−0.63, −0.34]
18.1 Negative emotions only 
(RQ3a)
22 −0.20 [−0.27, −0.13] 8 0.05 [−0.05, 0.14] 3 −0.18 [−0.46, 0.10] 7 −0.18 [−0.36, −0.01] 4 −0.79 [−0.94, −0.64]
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 24 −0.34 [−0.41, −0.28] 11 −0.36 [−0.44, −0.28] 0 11 −0.04 [−0.19, 0.11] 2 −0.63 [−0.79, −0.47]
21 First-person singularwO (RQ4) 21 −0.06 [−0.12, 0.01] 9 −0.22 [−0.30, −0.13] 2 −0.04 [−0.33, 0.24] 7 0.01 [−0.16, 0.19] 3 0.34 [0.20, 0.49]
25 Total third-person (RQ4) 27 −0.21 [−0.27, −0.15] 10 −0.31 [−0.40, −0.23] 2 −0.21 [−0.52, 0.09] 12 −0.04 [−0.18, 0.09] 3 −0.09 [−0.23, 0.06]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; gu = ES Hedges’s gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without outlier; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond 
to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates 
under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
aIndicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term.
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least in terms of number of words and temporal details). 
Note that liars seem to be less able to control their paraverbal 
behavior under high motivation (e.g., for pitch, response 
latency; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006) nor their visual nonver-
bal behavior (e.g., for eye contact; DePaulo et al., 2003).
Other linguistic cues under various research questions 
showed findings contrary to our hypothesis (see Table 5): (a) 
Only highly motivated liars used fewer different words (type-
token ratio: 0.67), (b) only moderately motivated liars built 
slightly shorter sentences (average sentence length: 0.15) 
than truth-tellers, (c) liars expressed more negative emo-
tional words than truth-tellers only when they were highly 
(−0.56, −1.03) or not motivated (−0.20, −0.19), (d) liars 
expressed more unspecified emotions (−0.53) than truth-tell-
ers when highly motivated, and (e) both highly (0.21, 0.25) 
and moderately motivated (both 0.12) liars reported fewer 
sensory–perceptual processes than truth-tellers, whereas not 
motivated liars tended to refer more often to these processes 
than truth-tellers (−0.22, −0.29).
Taken together, these results show a mixed picture. Our 
prediction that highly motivated liars would control their 
verbal behavior better than less motivated liars was con-
firmed for only two cues. However, our findings should not 
be over-interpreted because the number of studies with 
highly motivated participants was very small—calling for 
more research with highly motivated liars.
Production mode. Moderator analyses showed mixed find-
ings (see Table 6). Liars used fewer words (Research Ques-
tion 1—Cognitive Load) than truth-tellers under all 
production modes, though effects were larger for handwrit-
ten texts (0.33) and for transcripts from spoken accounts 
(0.26) than for typed texts (0.10). It seems that storytellers 
may use the opportunity to edit their accounts when typing, 
thus reducing the number of errors. More direct evidence 
for this point comes from a study by Derrick et al. (2012) 
who developed a specialized computer applet that clandes-
tinely recorded edits and revisions during real time syn-
chronous communication between a computer interviewer 
and senders. They found that when deceiving, people were 
significantly more likely to take longer and perform a 
greater number of edits to their responses (more frequently 
using the delete and backspace keys) than when telling the 
truth. To the extent that deceptive individuals are more 
likely to engage in such editing, differences in writing 
errors between true and false statements may be obscured. 
This might explain why the effect for number of typed 
words is smaller than for number of handwritten or spoken 
words.
In line with our hypothesis concerning details (Research 
Question 5), liars expressed fewer sensory–perceptual words 
than truth-tellers only when writing their accounts by hand 
(0.33, 0.34), whereas liars used fewer spatial details than 
truth-tellers only in typed accounts (0.13). Contrary to our 
hypothesis (but in line with Newman et al.’s, 2003, assump-
tion), liars used more motion verbs than truth-tellers when 
handwriting (−0.28) or speaking (−0.16), but not when typ-
ing them (0.00).
Our hypothesis concerning negative emotions (Research 
Question 3a) was not supported: Liars expressed more nega-
tions and negative emotions than truth-tellers when hand-
writing (−0.60, −0.28, respectively) rather than when 
speaking or typing. A potential reason for the larger effect in 
the handwriting condition could be that a writer might take 
more time to re-experience a negative emotion linked to the 
process of lying (see Ekman, 1988). Also, the special advan-
tage to edit typed words could be a reason why the difference 
between liars and truth-tellers disappeared under this condi-
tion. Interestingly, regarding unspecified emotions (Research 
Question 3c), liars’ spoken messages—compared with truth-
tellers’—showed no differences (−0.04) in unspecified emo-
tion words but more when typing (−0.44) or handwriting 
(−0.25).
In conclusion, the question of how the mode of produc-
tion affects the language of lying is not sufficiently answered. 
Again, other moderators such as interaction type or motiva-
tion may be confounded in these analyses. The pattern of 
findings that typed accounts showed smallest effects also 
Table 6. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When Studies Used Different Modes of Producing an Account.
Linguistic cue (RQ) k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
Handwritten k
2
Typed k
3
Spoken
01 Word quantity (RQ1) 38 0.19 [0.13, 0.24] 6 0.33 [0.21, 0.44] 14 0.10 [0.03, 0.17] 18 0.26 [0.15, 0.36]
17 Negations (RQ3a) 19 −0.19 [−0.26, −0.12] 5 −0.60 [−0.72, −0.46] 5 0.06 [−0.05, 0.17] 9 −0.14 [−0.28, −0.01]
18.1 Negative emotions only (RQ3a) 23 −0.04 [−0.11, 0.03] 3 −0.28 [−0.51, −0.05] 8 0.07 [−0.03, 0.16] 12 −0.14 [−0.25, −0.02]
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 21 −0.29 [−0.36, −0.22] 4 −0.25 [−0.44, −0.07] 6 −0.44 [−0.54, −0.35] 11 −0.04 [−0.16, 0.08]
28 Sensory–perceptual processesa (RQ5) 24 0.06 [−0.01, 0.13] 3 0.33 [0.11, 0.54] 8 0.01 [−0.08, 0.11] 13 0.06 [−0.06, 0.17]
28.1 Sensory–perceptual processes only (RQ5) 24 0.05 [−0.01, 0.12] 3 0.34 [0.12, 0.56] 8 0.00 [−0.09, 0.10] 13 0.05 [−0.07, 0.16]
30 Space (RQ5) 22 0.04 [−0.03, 0.11] 3 0.03 [−0.19, 0.24] 6 0.13 [0.02, 0.23] 13 −0.06 [−0.17, 0.05]
36 Motion verbswO (RQ5) 16 −0.09 [−0.17, −0.01] 2 −0.28 [−0.57, 0.00] 4 0.00 [−0.11, 0.11] 10 −0.16 [−0.29, −0.04]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; g
u
 = ES Hedges’s gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without outlier; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond 
to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates 
under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
aIndicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term.
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converges with the finding that computer-mediated commu-
nication showed smallest effects (Table 4 above). Future 
studies should investigate interaction intensity and produc-
tion mode in more detail, perhaps controlling for language 
proficiency and typing skill.
Computer program. The hypothesis that effects would be 
larger if statements were analyzed with programs specifi-
cally designed to detect deception (k = 8) rather than with 
LIWC (k = 26) or general programs (k = 11) was only con-
firmed for first-person plural pronouns (−0.31; see Table 7). 
Specific programs were more sensitive than LIWC or other 
general programs to differences in first-person plural pro-
nouns, finding more of these words among liars than among 
truth-tellers. Contrary to our hypothesis, four linguistic cues 
were found to have larger effects if LIWC or other general 
programs were used than with more specific programs. The 
direction of the effect for word quantity was even reversed if 
specific lie detection software was used. A parsimonious 
explanation may be that these specific programs were devel-
oped and used for different types of accounts. It also demon-
strates that the validity of linguistic cues to deception depends 
on the kind of program used. However, this conclusion is 
limited by the fact that we had to exclude quite a few studies 
using specialized software as these did not contain sufficient 
information to calculate effect sizes. Journal editors and 
grant agencies should emphasize completeness of data 
reporting including effect sizes (APA Publications and Com-
munications Board Working Group on Journal Article 
Reporting Standards, 2008).
Publication bias. The correlation between sample sizes (number 
of accounts) and the absolute value of all effect sizes (exclud-
ing extremely large samples to avoid skewed distributions) 
was r(904) = −.11, p < .001. This negative correlation could be 
due to a publication bias, that is, a tendency for significant 
findings to be more likely to be published than unpublished 
(Levine et al., 2009). However, our moderator analyses 
showed that for 7 of 12 cues, for which there was a significant 
difference between published and unpublished studies, effects 
were actually greater in unpublished studies (see Appendix E 
in supplemental online materials). Thus, publication bias is 
unlikely to be a threat to the validity of our conclusions.
General Discussion
Setting some of the exceptions discussed under the modera-
tor analyses aside we venture some take-home messages to 
our research questions, taking also rival theoretical 
approaches into consideration.
Research Question 1—Cognitive Load
Taken together, the notion that liars experience greater cog-
nitive load was mainly supported. As predicted from the 
working memory model and the cognitive load approach, 
lies were shorter (fewer words and fewer sentences), less 
elaborated (fewer different words), and less complex (fewer 
exclusive terms) than true stories. Even if liars were to stra-
tegically withhold information that could give them away, 
doing so would heighten their working memory burden, thus 
indirectly also supporting the cognitive load approach.
Research Question 2—Certainty
Because only three cues were investigated here and they 
yielded contradictory results, this question could hardly be 
answered. In general, the prediction for this research ques-
tion that liars look linguistically less certain than truth-tellers 
due to a lack of personal investment or feelings of ambiguity 
or guilt was not supported. Contrary to our prediction, truth-
tellers used more tentative words than liars.
Research Question 3a—Negative Emotions
Altogether, the prediction that liars express more negative 
emotion words and defend themselves to a greater extent 
than truth-tellers due to the experience of negative emotions 
when lying was corroborated. More specifically, liars 
expressed more terms of anger (rather than other negative 
emotions like anxiety and sadness) and denied accusations 
more often than truth-tellers.
Table 7. Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception When Studies Used LIWC, a General Program or a Specific Program.
Linguistic cue k Overall g
u
 [CI] k
1
LIWC k
2
General program k
3
Specific program
01 Word quantity 41 0.25 [0.20, 0.30] 23 0.28 [0.21, 0.34] 10 0.53 [0.43, 0.63] 8 −0.19 [−0.30, −0.07]
15 Emotions 25 −0.25 [−0.41, −0.28] 19 −0.39 [−0.45, −0.32] — — 6 −0.14 [−0.29, 0.02]
17 Negations 20 −0.15 [−0.22, −0.08] 17 0.05 [−0.03, 0.12] 3 −0.82 [−0.96, −0.69] — —
20 Total pronounswO 18 0.29 [0.20, 0.38] 13 0.38 [0.28, 0.49] 2 0.06 [−0.17, 0.28] 3 −0.13 [−0.44, 0.17]
k
1
LIWC + General program k
2
Specific program
22 First-person plural 25 −0.04 [−0.10, 0.02] 18 0.01 [−0.05, 0.08] 7 −0.31 [−0.46, −0.15]
Note. RQ = research question; k = number of hypothesis tests; g
u
 = ES Hedges’s g
u
, positive g
u
s indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative g
u
s indicate higher 
frequencies in deceptive accounts; ES = effect size; CI = 95% confidence interval; LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; wO = without outlier; bold ES indicate significant 
difference from zero; ES in italics correspond to the largest difference between liars and truth-tellers (in the predicted direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across 
the moderator variable levels; this indicates under what level of the moderator variable our hypotheses were most strongly supported.
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Research Question 3b—Positive Emotions
Our assumptions based on the fading-affect bias that truth-
tellers express more positive emotions than liars were not 
supported. While this result may be dependent on the type of 
lie being told, it does run counter to our assumptions from 
the autobiographical memory literature (as well as CBCA 
and RM research): Taken together, it appears wise to differ-
entiate specific emotions and feelings and separate them 
according to their valence.
Research Question 3c—Unspecified Emotions
In general, liars expressed more unspecified emotions (i.e., 
negative and positive emotions undifferentiated) than truth-
tellers. Given the results for different types of negative emo-
tions and positive emotions, linguistic researchers should 
revisit their analyses to separate different types of emotions.
Research Question 4—Distancing
As expected, liars distanced themselves from events more than 
truth-tellers by using fewer self-references (total first-person) 
and more other-references (total second- and total third-per-
son). However, liars and truth-tellers did not differ in terms of 
generalizing terms, use of passive voice or verb tenses.
Research Question 5—Details
Overall, the RM approach was only partially supported. We 
only found small effects for some cues (sensory–perceptual 
processes only, particularly when motivation is high or the 
account is handwritten, hearing words and quantifiers) but 
null-findings for most other cues. In their review on interna-
tional RM research, Masip et al. (2005) concluded that 
visual and auditory details, contextual and temporal infor-
mation were the most discriminative criteria. The discrepan-
cies may either be due to the fact that the RM criteria cannot 
easily be captured by word-counting programs like LIWC, 
or the fact that the LIWC categories were not created on the 
basis of RM theory (see Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 
2007). Coding RM criteria and indicators involves much 
more than mere word counting, and only well-trained human 
raters, who also take the context of specific words or sen-
tences, as well as the background or motivation of a state-
ment into account, can do it.
Research Question 6—Cognitions
We found that truth-tellers used more words indicating cog-
nitive processes than liars. The findings support our predic-
tions from autobiographical memory theory that persons 
refer more often to retrieval processes, supporting memories, 
and cognitive operations when talking about true events but 
contradicts the assumption of many RM deception research-
ers who postulate the opposite (e.g., Vrij, 2008a).
Limitations
Several limitations restrict the generalizability of our find-
ings. First, we had to exclude more than 50 studies for differ-
ent reasons (see Appendix G in supplemental online 
materials). Most of these studies did not provide sufficient 
statistical data, or calculated linguistic patterns in a way not 
suitable for our analysis (e.g., Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). 
While we are grateful to all authors who provided us with 
additional data, journal editors should emphasize the report-
ing of all results, not just significant ones, along with effect 
sizes like Cohen’s d.
Second, we were able to find significant effects for many 
linguistic cues (see Table 1). These effects were generally 
very small according to Cohen (1988), but not much smaller 
than those for nonverbal and paraverbal cues meta-analyzed 
by DePaulo et al. (2003) and Sporer and Schwandt (2006, 
2007). However, even if all cues had been in the predicted 
direction, the mean g
u
 = 0.26 is rather disappointing com-
pared with mean effect sizes in the social-psychological 
literature (Richard et al., 2003: M g
u
 = 0.43; r = 0.21, 
SD = 0.15).
Third, for those linguistic cues where effect size distribu-
tions were quite heterogeneous, and sensitive to moderator 
variables, general conclusions can only be very tentative. 
Specific circumstances of individual studies documented in 
Appendix C should be considered for specific types of lies, 
topics, paradigms, or production modes.
Fourth, most findings were only available for the English 
language. As Newman et al. (2003) discussed, deception 
may be manifested through different linguistic cues in differ-
ent languages. For example, Romanic languages do not 
require the use of specific personal pronouns, because pro-
nouns are already expressed by the verb form (e.g., Masip, 
Bethencourt, Lucas, Sánchez-San Segundo, & Herrero, 
2012). Unfortunately, no moderator analysis could be con-
ducted for language, because only four studies analyzed 
accounts in languages other than English. Besides language, 
culture might also make a difference. For example, Taylor, 
Tomblin, Conchie, and Menacere (2011) found that North 
African participants used first-person pronouns most fre-
quently when lying, whereas White British participants used 
them most frequently when telling the truth.
Fifth, differences between children and adults became 
evident as three out of four studies conducted with children 
were detected as significant outliers, though not for the same 
cues. This underscores the need to investigate differences 
between adults’ and children’s linguistic cues to deception 
separately. Furthermore, not all children are equal. Linguistic 
skills develop during childhood, and this may presumably 
influence the frequency of some potential linguistic decep-
tion markers. Children of different ages may show different 
linguistic cues to deception.
Despite these limitations, our meta-analyses were the first 
large effort to quantitatively synthesize research in this area. 
Therefore, they can be seen as the most accurate estimate to 
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date of linguistic differences between liars and truth-tellers 
assessed by computer programs.
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research
The main goal of the present meta-analysis was to assess the 
extent to which computer programs are valid and useful 
tools to detect deception in verbal accounts. We provided 
clear operational definitions for each cue, derived from an 
analysis and integration of definitions from different 
research domains. We then posed theoretically based 
hypotheses as to the direction of effects for all cues, as well 
as concerning potential moderator variables. While not all 
results could be reported due to space limitations, additional 
appendices and analyses as well as all our raw data are avail-
able as supplemental online materials. Researchers are 
invited to peruse our rich database for additional analyses. 
Future research should also look at the intercorrelations 
between linguistic cues to arrive at a better theoretical 
understanding.
In addition, future research should consider the context of 
deceptive versus truthful utterances. A potential reason why 
only small to medium effect sizes were found in general 
could be that most computer programs simply count single 
words without considering the semantic context. If this sug-
gestion goes beyond what computer programs can do at this 
time, perhaps the linguistic cues with greater effect sizes (for 
the respective paradigms) should be weighted more heavily 
than those with smaller or nonsignificant effects. A recent 
attempt in this direction was made by Chandramouli, Chen, 
and Subbalakshmi (2011), who employed several weighting 
mechanisms. They applied for an international patent for 
their invention of this weighing mechanism.
Ultimately, researchers should directly compare the per-
formance of computers versus human raters. As context is 
relevant in analyzing and judging a statement, human raters’ 
assessments of certain linguistic cues might lead to more pro-
nounced differences than objective computer-based codings. 
However, the advantages of computer-based coding should 
not be overlooked. Humans and computers are best at differ-
ent skills. Humans are less accurate in manual counting of 
specific cues or in rendering accurate judgments of complex 
syntactic relationships, whereas computers cannot provide 
subjective, gestalt-like judgments or capture the meaning or 
intention of what people are saying (for an example of com-
puter-assisted subjective codings, see Sporer, 2012).
Finally, we encourage researchers to further investigate 
the impact of (a) different interview and interaction condi-
tions, (b) mode of production, (c) types of events, (d) age of 
sender, and (e) language on linguistic markers of deception. 
In line with Hancock and Woodworth (2013), we found that 
linguistic cues to deception are sensitive to contextual fac-
tors (see moderator variables). These variables are relevant 
in applied contexts (forensic, work and organizational set-
tings). Researchers should strive to design experiments con-
taining psychological features analogous to real world 
deceptive situations to enhance ecological validity (e.g., 
opportunity for preparation, or high motivation).
In sum, to answer the question whether computer pro-
grams are effective lie detectors, our answer must be rather 
skeptical at this time. The effects were not significant for 
many of the variables studied or small in magnitude, or mod-
erated by situational variables. Alternative theoretical 
approaches may find other cues or moderators to be impor-
tant. At this time, researchers’, and particularly practitio-
ners’, (unrealistic) dream has yet to come true.
Appendix A
Definition of Linguistic Cues to Deception Assigned to Research Questions.
Linguistic cue Final operational definition
Research Question 1: Do liars experience greater cognitive load?
01a Word quantity // word count // number of 
words // productivity
Total number of words
02 Content word diversity // diversity // content 
diversity
Total number of different content words divided by total number of content 
words, where content words express lexical meaning
03 Type-token ratio // unique words // lexical 
diversity // different words
% of distinct words divided by total number of words
04 Six-letter words // percentage words longer than 
six letters
% of words that are longer than six letters
05 Average word length (AWL; complexity) // 
lexical complexity
Total number of letters divided by the total number of words
06a Verb quantity // verb count Total number of verbs
07a Sentence quantity // number of sentences Total number of sentences
08 Average sentence length (complexity measure) 
// words per sentence
Total number of words divided by total numbers of sentences
(continued)
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Linguistic cue Final operational definition
09 Causation % of words that try to assign a cause to whatever the person is describing 
(e.g., because, effect, hence)
10 Exclusive % of words that make a distinction what is in a category and what is not 
(e.g., without, except, but)
11 Writing errors // typographical error ratio 
(informality) // typo ratio // misspelled words
% of writing errors or misspelled words divided by number of words
Research Question 2: Are liars less certain than truth-tellers?
12 Tentative % of tentative words (e.g., maybe, perhaps, see)
13 Modal verbs // uncertainty // discrepancy % of modal verbs or auxiliary verbs or words expressing uncertainty (e.g., 
should, would, could)
14 Certainty % of words that express certainty (e.g., always, never)
Research Question 3a: Do liars use more negations and negative emotion words?
17 Negations // less positive tone // spontaneous 
negations // negation connectives
% of words that express negations (e.g., no, never, not)
18b Negative emotions // negative affect // anger // 
anxiety, fear // sadness
% of words that express negative emotion/affect (e.g., hate, worthless, 
enemy) AND anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed) AND anxiety (e.g., worried, 
fearful, nervous) AND sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad)
18.1 Negative emotions (only) // negative affect % of words that express negative emotion/affect (e.g., hate, worthless, 
enemy)
18.2 Anger % of words that express anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed)
18.3 Anxiety % of words that express anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful, nervous)
18.4 Sadness % of words that express sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad)
Research Question 3b: Do liars use less positive emotion words?
19b Positive emotions and feelings // positive 
emotions // positive affects // positive feelings
% of words that express positive emotion/affect (e.g., happy, pretty, good) 
AND positive feelings (e.g., joy, love)
19.1 Positive emotions (only) // positive affect % of words that express positive emotion/affect (e.g., happy, pretty, good)
19.2 Positive feelings (only) % of words that express positive feelings (e.g., joy, love)
Research Question 3c: Do liars express more or less unspecified emotion words?
15 Emotions // emotional / affective processes // 
affect (ratio) // positive and negative affect
% of words that express any type of emotions/affects (e.g., happy, ugly, 
bitter)
16 Pleasantness and unpleasantness % of words that express pleasantness/unpleasantness
Research Question 4: Do liars distance themselves more from events?
20 Total pronouns // personal pronouns % of all personal (e.g., I, our, they) or total pronouns (e.g., that, somebody, 
the)
21 First-person singular % of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, my, me)
22 First-person plural % of first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, our)
23 Total first-person % of first-person singular and first-person plural pronouns (e.g., I, we, me)
24 Total second-person % of second-person pronouns (e.g., you, you’ll)
25 Total third-person // other references // third-
person singular // third-person plural
% of third-person pronouns (e.g., she, their, them)
26 Passive voice verbs // verbal nonimmediacy % of passive voice verbs (e.g., “it was searched for”)
27 Generalizing terms // leveling terms % of generalizing terms (e.g., everybody, all, anybody)
47 Past tense verb % of past tense verbs (e.g., went, drove, ate)
48 Present tense verb % of present tense verbs of all words (e.g., walk, run, cry)
Research Question 5: Do liars use fewer (sensory and contextual) details?
28b Sensory–perceptual processes // perceptual 
processes/information // perceptions and sense // 
sensory ratio // see // hear // feel
% of words that express sensory–perceptual processes (e.g., taste, touch, 
feel) AND visual (e.g., view, saw, seen) AND haptical (e.g., feels, touch) 
AND aural (e.g., listen, hearing) sensory–perceptual processes
28.1 Sensory–perceptual processes (only) // 
perceptual processes // perceptual information // 
perceptions and sense // sensory ratio
% of words that express sensory–perceptual processes (e.g., taste, touch, 
feel)
28.2 Seeing % of words that express visual sensory–perceptual processes (e.g., view, 
saw, seen)
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Linguistic cue Final operational definition
28.3 Feeling % of words that express tactile sensory–perceptual processes (e.g., feels, 
touch)
28.4 Hearing % of words that express aural sensory–perceptual processes (e.g., listen, 
hearing)
29 Time // temporal ratio // temporal specificity // 
temporal cohesion
% of temporal words (e.g., hour, day, o’clock)
30 Space // spatial terms // spatial ratio // spatial 
specificity // spatial cohesion
% of spatial words (e.g., around, over, up)
31 Temporal-spatial terms // temporal and spatial 
details total // spatio-temporal information // space 
and time
% of temporal (e.g., hour, day, o’clock) AND spatial words (e.g., around, 
over, up)
32 Prepositions % of prepositions (e.g., on, to, from)
33 Numbers % of numbers (e.g., first, one, thousand)
34 Quantifier % of quantifier (e.g., all, bit, few, less)
35 Modifiers (adverbs and adjectives) // rate 
of adjectives and adverbs (specificity and 
expressiveness)
% of modifier: adverbs and adjectives (e.g., here, much, few, very)
36 Motion verbs // motion terms % of words that describe movements (e.g., walk, move, go)
Research Question 6: Do liars refer less often to cognitive processes?
37 Cognitive processes // all connectives % of words related to cognitive processes (e.g., cause, know, ought)
38 Insight % of words related to a person’s insight (e.g., think, know, consider)
Note. Bold font indicates the name of the linguistic cue chosen for this meta-analysis. % indicates number of specific words divided by total number of 
words.
aNo ratio.
bIndicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term.
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Definition of Linguistic Cues to Deception—Miscellaneous Category.
Linguistic cue Final operational definition
39 Redundancy Ratio of function words to number of sentences. Function words, such as articles and pronouns, are used to 
form grammatical relationships between other words. // The ratio of the number of function words to the 
number of messages // Repetitive words // Argument overlap: Explicit overlap between two sentences by 
tracking the common nouns in either single or plural form
40 Assent % of words that express an assent (e.g., agree, ok, yes)
41 Articles % of articles (e.g., a, lot, an, the)
42 Inhibition % of words that express inhibition (e.g., block, constrain, stop)
43 Social processes % of words that express social processes (e.g., talk, us, friend)
44 Friends % of words that are related to friends (e.g., buddy, friend, neighbor)
45 Family % of words that are related to family (e.g., daughter, husband, aunt)
46 Humans % of words that are related to humans (e.g., adult, baby, boy)
49 Future tense verb % of future tense verbs (e.g., will, going to)
50 Inclusive % of inclusive words (e.g., with, and, include)
51 Achievement % of words that express achievement (e.g., earn, hero, win)
52 Leisure % of words that express leisure activities (e.g., cook, chat, movie)
53 Emotiveness Total number of adjectives and total numbers of adverbs divided by total number of nouns and total numbers 
of verbs
54 Pausality Total number of punctuation marks divided by total number of sentences
55 Swear words % of swear words (e.g., ass, heck, shit)
56 Biology % of words that express biological processes/states (e.g., eat, pain, wash)
57 Health % of words that express health issues (e.g., hospital, pill, flu)
(continued)
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58 Sexual % of words that express sexual activities/states (e.g., passion, rape, sex)
59 Optimism % of words that express optimism (e.g., certainty, pride, win)
60 Communication % of words that express communication (e.g., talk, share, converse)
61 Occupation % of words that express occupation (e.g., work, class, boss)
62 School % of words that express school issues (e.g., class, student, college)
63 Job/work % of words that express job issues (e.g., employ, boss, career)
64 Home % of words that express home issues (e.g., bed, home, room)
65 Sports % of words that express sport (e.g., football, game, play)
66 Money % of words that express money and financial issues (e.g., cash, taxes, income)
67 Physical % of words that express physical states and functions (e.g., ache, breast, sleep)
68 Body % of words that express body states and symptoms (e.g., asleep, heart, cough)
69 Eating % of words that express eating, drinking, dieting issues (e.g., eat, swallow, taste)
Note. % indicates number of specific words divided by total number of words.
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Coding Decisions for Moderator Variables for Each Study.
Authors (year)
Publication 
type Program Language Theory Selection Age Preparation
Event 
type Valence Interaction Motivation Mode
Ali and Levine (2008, denials) publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low spoken
Ali and Levine (2008, 
confessions)
publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low spoken
Almela Sanchez-Lafuente, 
Valencia-Garcia, and Cantos 
Gomez (2012)
publ. LIWC01 S none a priori adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. none low typed
Bedwell, Gallagher, Whitten, 
and Fiore (2011)
publ. Coh-Metrix E other sign. adults prep. trivial LE neutral instruct. low spoken
G. D. Bond and Lee (2005) publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a priori adults prep. video neg. interact. low spoken
Brunet (2009)a Thesis LIWC01 E LIWC a priori child. n/a sign. LE neg./pos. interview none spoken
Burgoon and Qin (2006) publ. GATE E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a other neutral interview low spoken
Chen (2010; Dataset 3) Diss. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a n/a neutral none n/a typed
Colwell, Hiscock, and Memon 
(2002)
publ. Wordscan E other a priori adults n/a live neg. interview n/a n/a
J. E. Cooper (2008) Diss. Connexorb E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a other neutral n/a n/a typed
Derrick, Meservy, Burgoon, 
and Nunamaker (2012)
pres. ADAM E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a other neutral none low typed
Dzindolet and Pierce (2005) pres. LIWC01 E LIWC a priori adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. instruct. n/a written
Evans et al. (2012, Interview 
1)
publ. LIWC01 E LIWC a priori child. n/a other pos. interview none n/a
Fuller, Biros, Burgoon, 
Adkins, and Twitchell (2006, 
Agent99A.)
pres. Agent99A.b E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a real case neg. n/a high written
Hancock, Curry, Goorha, and 
Woodworth (2008)
Duran, Hall, McCarthy, and 
McNamara (2010)
publ. LIWC01/
Coh-Metrix
E IDT/RM a priori adults prep. trivial LE neg./pos. cmc n/a typed
Humpherys, Moffitt, Burns, 
Burgoon, and Felix (2011)
publ. Agent99A. E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a real case neutral none high typed
Jensen, Bessarabova, Adame, 
Burgoon, and Slowik (2011)
publ. LIWC01 E other a priori adults n/a real case neg. interview high n/a
Koyanagi and Blandón-Gitlin 
(2011)
pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a priori child. no other neutral interview none spoken
Krackow (2010) publ. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a priori adults prep. trivial LE neg./pos. instruct. none spoken
Lee, Welker, and Odom 
(2009)
publ. LIWC01 E other a priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed
Liu, Hancock, Zhang, Xu, 
Markowitz, and Bazarova 
(2012)
pres. LIWC07b E LIWC a priori adults n/a real case neg. interact. high n/a
Masip, Bethencourt, Lucas, 
Sánchez-San Segundo, and 
Herrero (2012)
publ. LIWC07 S IDT/RM a priori adults no trivial LE pos. instruct. low written
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Authors (year)
Publication 
type Program Language Theory Selection Age Preparation
Event 
type Valence Interaction Motivation Mode
Morgan, Colwell, and Hazlett 
(2011, free recall)
publ. “automated 
analysis 
method”
E none a priori adults n/a n/a neg. interview low spoken
Morgan, Mishara, Christian, 
and Hazlett (2008, free 
recall)
publ. n/a (general) A none a priori adults no mock 
crime
neg. interview med. spoken
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, 
and Richards (2003, Exp. 1)
publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral instruct. low spoken
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 2) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral instruct. low typed
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 3) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral none low written
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 4) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. instruct. low spoken
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 5) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low spoken
Ott, Choi, Cardie, and 
Hancock (2011)
pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM sign. adults n/a att./liking pos. none low typed
Qin, Burgoon, Blair, and 
Nunamaker (2005, audio)
pres. GATE E other a priori adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low spoken
Qin et al. (2005, face-to-face) pres. GATE E other a priori adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low n/a
Qin et al. (2005, text chat) pres. GATE E other a priori adults n/a mock 
crime
neg. interview low typed
Rowe and Blandón-Gitlin 
(2008)
pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a priori adults no other neutral interview none spoken
Schafer (2007, Exp. 1) Diss. MS Word E other a priori adults n/a video neg. n/a none written
Schafer (2007, Exp. 2) Diss. MS Word E other a priori adults n/a video neg. n/a none written
Schelleman-Offermans and 
Merckelbach (2010)
publ. LIWC01 D LIWC a priori adults n/a sign. LE neg. n/a none typed
Suckle-Nelson et al. (2010, 
free recall)
publ. Wordscan E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a staged neg. interview none spoken
ten Brinke and Porter (2012) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC a priori adults n/a real case neg. interact. high spoken
Van Swol, Braun, and 
Malhotra (2012)
publ. LIWC07b E IDT/RM a priori adults n/a other neutral interact. med. spoken
Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, 
Bala, and Lee (2012)
subm.c LIWC07 E LIWC a priori child. n/a sign. LE neutral interview none spoken
Zhou (2005) publ. “NLP tool” E other a priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed
Zhou et al. (2004) publ. iSkim/CueCal E other a priori adults n/a other neutral cmc none typed
Zhou and Zhang (2004) pres. “Message 
analyzing 
software”
E other a priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed
Note. publ. = published; pres. = presented (poster or paper); Diss. = Dissertation; subm. = submitted; LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; LIWC01 = LIWC 2001; 
LIWC07 = LIWC 2007; GATE = General Architecture for Text Engineering; ADAM = Automated Deception Analysis Machine; Agent99A. = Agent99Analyzer; MS Word = 
Microsoft Word; NLP = natural language processing; Language: A = Arabic; D = Dutch; E = English; S= Spanish; IDT = interpersonal deception theory; RM = reality monitoring; 
sign. = significant; child. = children; prep. = preparation; n/a = not available; att. = attitude; LE = life events; staged = staged event; instruct. = instruction; med. = medium; cmc = 
computer-mediated communication.
aIn the meantime, Brunet et al. (2013) formally published the data of Brunet’s thesis.
bStudy additionally applied a second program.
cIn the meantime, Williams et al. (2012) published their (at the time of conducting the meta-analyses unpublished) manuscript.
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Notes
1. Similar to Vrij (2008a), we use this term to denote theory 
regarding both emotions or feelings and arousal. While differ-
ences between these states have been noted, their overlap has 
also been acknowledged (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 
1981).
2. Ekman (2001) noted that a liar may experience joy (“duping 
delight”). However, the link between this emotion and verbal 
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cues to deception is not clear (Vrij, 2008a). Therefore, we do 
not consider it further.
3. Due to empty cells or small cell sizes in each category, we had 
to merge previously more differentiated categories to broader 
categories (see Appendix C).
4. Although we are aware of some potential confounding vari-
ables, such as production mode, communication medium, 
perspective of sender (e.g., actor or observer), or length of 
interaction, we developed this moderator variable to find sub-
groups of studies that were similar in terms of the intensity of 
interaction between sender and another person. Originally, the 
categories were more sophisticated, but due to small cell sizes, 
we had to collapse some related categories.
5. Although we consider word count an important variable, this 
variable has been investigated in several other meta-anal-
yses (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1985: combination of duration and num-
ber of words), plus in all the studies that investigated linguistic 
cues summarized here. Also, many studies on content cues to 
deception assessed by humans have reported on word count, 
usually by using a word processor. To review all these studies 
(likely to be several hundred) where the main focus was not 
on computer-aided detection of deception would constitute a 
meta-analysis of its own and is beyond the scope of this article.
6. Even when four outliers (with two positive and two negative 
values) were excluded for negative emotions only, the effect 
remained significant (k = 20, −0.12 [−0.19, −0.04]).
7. Due to the fairly large number of potential pairwise compari-
sons for each moderator variable and linguistic cue, we did 
not calculate these specific comparisons. More differentiated 
results for homogeneity test statistics between and within 
groups as well as all other (e.g., nonsignificant) moderator-
analytic results can be requested from the first author.
8. Because purely positive events (k = 3) as well as a combination 
of positive and negative events (k = 6) were quite rarely used, 
they were excluded from moderator analyses.
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